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INTRODUCTION 
In 1979, Gary Mootz and his partner opened the Male Image 
barbershop in the Castro district of San Francisco.1 For over 40 years, 
patrons walked through its doors to discuss the latest in political and 
social goings-on, while enjoying $18 dollar haircuts.2 Little did Mootz 
know as he rang in the 2020 New Year that an impending viral pandemic, 
originating thousands of miles away in Wuhan, China, would result in his 
business being forcibly shut down by a California Executive Order,3 
ultimately resulting in its permanent closure just months later.4  
Six miles away, foodies and tourists alike have enjoyed meals and 
unobstructed views of the Pacific Ocean at the Cliff House for 157 years.5 
The iconic restaurant, which weathered a storied history including two 
fires, earthquake damage, visits by five United States presidents, a movie 
appearance, and a feature in the video game Watch Dogs 2, likewise could 
not withstand the financial harm caused by lockdowns and governmental 
restrictions.6 On December 31, 2020, the Cliff House closed 
 
 1. Steven Bracco, Castro barbershop closes after 40 years in the neighborhood, HOODLINE (June 
29, 2020), https://hoodline.com/2020/06/castro-barbershop-closes-after-40-years-in-the-neighborhood/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Exec. Order No. 33-20, EXEC. DEP’T ST. OF CAL. (Mar. 4, 2020), 
https://covid19.ca.gov/img/N-33-20.pdf. 
 4. See Bracco, supra note 1. 
 5. Bay City News, San Francisco’s historic Cliff House restaurant to close permanently, ABC 
NEWS (Dec. 14, 2020), https://abc7news.com/society/sfs-iconic-cliff-house-restaurant-to-close-
permanently-/8756231/. 
 6. Id. (noting that the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated the restaurant’s financial problems, but it 
was not the sole reason the restaurant closed its doors). See also History, THE CLIFF HOUSE, 
https://cliffhouse.com/history/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2020); Cliff House, FANDOM, 
https://watchdogs.fandom.com/wiki/Cliff_House (last visited Dec. 22, 2020); and Cliff House, San 
Francisco, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cliff_House,_San_Francisco (last visited Dec. 22, 
2020). 
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permanently—leaving 180 employees without jobs.7 
More than two thousand miles to its east, Governor Andy Beshear 
issued an executive order on March 22, 2020, mandating that all 
nonessential businesses close,8 leading to the permanent cessation of  
Highland Fitness, a Louisville, Kentucky neighborhood fitness center.9 
This venture, which operated for over twelve years, succumbed to the 
financial strains of the lockdowns.10 Highland Fitness is not an anomaly; 
by August 2020, almost 300 Louisville businesses closed permanently 
due to mandated lockdowns and restrictions.11 For those that remained 
operational, revenue had declined almost 26 percent since the start of the 
pandemic, with some revenues falling 50 to 75 percent.12 These small 
business casualties, accompanied by countless other stories of the 
lockdowns' devastating economic impact across the United States, have 
become increasingly familiar; however, they are largely overshadowed by 
the COVID-19 public health crisis.13 
The first confirmed case of COVID-19 appeared in the United States 
on January 20, 2020.14 Eleven days after the initial United States patient 
diagnosis, then-President Donald Trump issued Proclamation 9984, 
suspending border entry to those arriving from the People’s Republic of 
China.15 Just one week prior, China officially locked down Wuhan, which 
was ground zero for the pandemic, with approximately 11 million 
 
 7. Bay City News, supra note 5. 
 8. Executive Order No. 2020-246, COMMONWEALTH OF KY. (Mar. 22, 2020), 
https://governor.ky.gov/attachments/20200322_Executive-Order_2020-246_Retail.pdf. 
 9. Haley Cawthon, Highland Fitness closes permanently due to Covid-19, LOUISVILLE BUS. 
FIRST (Aug. 21, 2020, 1:38 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/louisville/news/2020/08/21/highland-
fitness-closes-due-to-covid.html. 
 10. Id. See also Highland Fitness, FACEBOOK (July 30, 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/HighlandFit/. 
 11. Haley Cawthon, Yelp data shows nearly 300 Louisville businesses have permanently closed 
since March, WLJY (Aug. 17, 2020, 11:18 AM), https://www.wlky.com/article/yelp-data-shows-nearly-
300-louisville-businesses-have-permanently-closed-since-march/33623385. Note, for simplicity 
purposes, this article references “lockdown” to include any resulting restrictions on businesses’ free flow 
of commerce, to include social distancing and ensuing state-mandated capacity limitations on business 
enterprises. 
 12. Gina Glaros, Louisville small businesses’’ overall revenue down 26% during pandemic, 
WDRB (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.wdrb.com/news/louisville-small-businesses-overall-revenue-down-
26-during-pandemic/article_956b865e-3a48-11eb-829d-e329000e2f8e.html. 
 13. See COVID-19’s economic fallout will long outlive the health crisis, report warns, UNCTAD 
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://unctad.org/news/covid-19s-economic-fallout-will-long-outlive-health-crisis-
report-warns. 
 14. See Erin K. Stokes et. al, Coronavirus Disease 2019 Case Surveillance – United States, 
January 22 – May 30, 2020, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 69 MORBIDITY AND 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 759, 760 (June 15, 2020).  
 15. See Proclamation 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Republic of China) (Jan. 31, 2020) (suspending 
“entry into the United States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of all aliens who were physically present 
within the People's Republic of China”). 
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inhabitants.16 
Less than two months after initiating the Schengen border suspension, 
and on the same day that the World Health Organization (“WHO”) 
declared the virus a global pandemic, the United States temporarily 
suspended travel from Europe.17 On March 13, 2020, as the stock market 
crashed and oil prices plunged, Mr. Trump declared a “national 
emergency.”18 America was fighting an invisible enemy, with the 
Executive branch, politicians, and the media alike, referring to the 
nation’s crusade against the novel virus as a "War on COVID.”19 
As the outbreak continued, governors in all but seven states issued 
executive orders directing residents to stay-at-home and temporarily 
forced any businesses identified as nonessential to close, including retail 
establishments, dine-in restaurants, fitness centers, and theaters.20 Only 
those ventures deemed essential, such as grocers, emergency services, 
healthcare, information technologies, transportation, and energy, 
remained operational.21 For the first time in United States history or case 
 
 16. Inside China’s Virus Zone, Unease Gropes a City in Lockdown, BLOOMBERG (Updated Jan. 
23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-23/inside-china-s-virus-zone-unease-
grips-a-city-in-lockdown. 
 17. Lev Facher, Trump suspends travel from Europe for 30 days in response to coronavirus 
outbreak, STAT (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/11/trump-europe-travel-ban/. See 
also Presidential Proclamation 9993, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,045, 15,046 (suspending “entry into the United 
States, as immigrants or nonimmigrants, of all aliens who were physically present within the Schengen 
Area”). The Schengen Area includes:  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
 18. Lev Facher, President Trump just declared the coronavirus pandemic a national emergency. 
Here’s what that means, STAT (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/13/national-
emergency-coronavirus/. 
 19. See, e.g., Jacqueline Policastro, The military’s war on COVID-19, WMCACTIONNEWS5 (Oct. 
15, 2020, 4:20 PM), https://www.wmcactionnews5.com/2020/10/15/militarys-war-covid-/; Alex 
Fitzpatrick, Why the U.S. Is Losing the War on COVID-19, TIME (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://time.com/5879086/us-covid-19/; Dick Hoskins, Trump’s ‘war’ on COVID-19, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 
8. 2020), https://missoulian.com/opinion/letters/trumps-war-on-covid-19/article_f947ddef-43a9-558f-
bcb6-0b44a682ff93.html; and Jonathan Levin et al., Republican War on Covid Orders Grinds on Despite 
Trump’s Illness, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
10-03/republican-war-on-covid-orders-grinds-on-despite-trump-s-illness. 
 20. See Maggie Davis et al., Governors’ Emergency Declarations During The Covid-19 
Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 95, 95 (2020). See also States that did not issue stay-at-home orders in 
response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/States_that_did_not_issue_stay-at-home_orders_in_response_to_the_ 
coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020 (last visited Dec. 22, 2020) (explaining that the seven states 
that never issued stay at home orders during March or April 2020 were: Arkansas, Iowa, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming). See also Chabon et al., Shelter in Place Orders: Are You an 
“Essential Business”?, 10 THE NAT’L L. REV. no. 83 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com 
/article/shelter-place-orders-are-you-essential-business. 
 21. See Elizabeth Brenner, Love (Of the Constitution) and Liberty in the Time of Covid-19: The 
Role of a Lawyer Is Vigilance, 83 TEX. B. J. 462, 462 (2020) (documenting that only “essential businesses” 
could remain open amidst state-wide COVID closures). See also Chabon et al., supra note 20. 
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law, arbitrary lines were established to distinguish between essential and 
nonessential business operations.22  
Within six months of the pandemic’s onset in the United States, 60 
percent of businesses forcibly shut down permanently due to the stay-at-
home executive orders.23 For those small to mid-size businesses 
remaining operational, 43 percent reported a “significant to severe 
impact” due to decreased sales, diminished business valuations, and lost 
revenue.24 In contrast, big-box retailers like Walmart, Target, Costco and 
Amazon, all essential by state government standards, profited from the 
forced closures of over 140,000 nonessential businesses.25 These large, 
one-stop establishments that provide food, necessities,  contactless 
shopping, home delivery, and have matured e-commerce platforms, 
reported record sales in 2020.26 Even after states lifted closure restrictions 
on the nonessential businesses, a myriad of operational constraints 
required these businesses to maintain capacity limits and follow stringent 
guidelines.27 Forced closures and limitations proved disastrous for already 
fragile small businesses unable to defend themselves against the financial 
tsunami.28 To address these injustices, some have suggested the 
 
 22. See Irene Jiang, Here’s the difference between an ‘essential’ business and a ‘nonessential’ 
business as more than 30 states have imposed restrictions, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-a-nonessential-business-essential-business-coronavirus-2020-
3 (noting that although there existed some types of business operations that all states seemed to identify 
as being either “essential” or “nonessential”, it was up to each individual city and state to determine more 
specifically which business could stay open, versus close). See also Omnistone Corp. v. Cuomo, 485 F. 
Supp 3d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2020), and White v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192293 (W.D.N.Y. 
2020) (identifying the first two United States cases which draw distinctions between “essential” and 
“nonessential” business operations). 
 23. Local Economic Impact Report, YELP (Sept. 2020), https://www.yelpeconomica 
verage.com/business-closures-update-sep-2020.html (Total permanent business closures reported were 
97,966). 
 24. See Sandy McKenzie, Small Businesses Feel Biggest Impact of Coronavirus Pandemic, 
BUSINESSWIRE (Oct. 8, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
home/20201008005232/en/Small-Businesses-Feel-Biggest-Impact-of-Coronavirus-Pandemic (data 
derived from a CBIZ survey analyzing more than 1,600 United States businesses). 
 25. Hayley Peterson, The pandemic is ramping up the war between Amazon, Walmart, and Target, 
and making them more powerful than ever, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2020, 9:45 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-walmart-and-target-are-getting-more-powerful-2020-8.  See 
also Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000 establishments that temporarily shut down due to 
the pandemic are now out of business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28. 2020, 10:25 AM), 
https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covid-buisnesses-shut-down-closed/. 
 26. Gillian Friedman, Big-Box Retailers’ Profits Surge as Pandemic Marches On, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/19/business/coronavirus-walmart-target-home-
depot.html. See also Sraders & Lambert, supra note 25. 
 27. See, e.g., Staff, Where states reopened and cases spiked after the U.S. shutdown, WASH. POST 
(updated Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/states-reopening-
coronavirus-map/; @CAgovernor, TWITTER (Oct. 3, 2020, 1:00 PM), https://twitter.com 
/CAgovernor/status/1312437371460173825. 
 28. Alexander W. Bartik et al., The Impact of Covid-19 on Small Business Outcomes and 
Expectations, 117 PNAS, no. 30, 17656-17666 (July 28, 2020), https://www.pnas.org/content 
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imposition of an excess profits tax on large companies profiting from the 
pandemic.29 In addition, legal arguments promote that just compensation 
be provided to closed businesses under the Constitutional Takings 
Clause.30 Meanwhile, Congress entertained its own legislative remedies 
in the form of the Coronvirus and Economic Security Act (hereinafter “the 
CARES Act”).31 
To rescue the rapidly declining United States economy and support 
individuals and businesses, on March 27, 2020, Congress enacted the 
CARES Act, which contains over $2 trillion in economic relief.32 In 
addition to providing taxpayer stimulus checks and business reprieve via 
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) forgivable loans, the CARES Act 
contains several tax relief provisions that relax business’ net operating 
losses and deduction restrictions.33 However, at present there are no 
proposals at the federal or state levels directing compensatory relief 
specifically to nonessential businesses for the various harms suffered 
from forcible lock downs, at the exclusion of the essential businesses.  
 
/117/30/17656. See also, Michael T. Osterholm & Mark Olshaker, Why We Are So Ill-Prepared for a 
Possible Pandemic Like Coronavirus, TIME (Feb. 4, 2020), https://time.com/5777923/america-prepared-
pandemic-coronavirus/. 
 29. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yohan, COVID-19 and US Tax Policy: What Needs to Change?, PUB. 
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, NO. 679 (Apr. 2020) (suggesting the enactment of an 
excess profits tax on corporations benefitting from the pandemic); Press Release, Rep. Tulsi Gabbard: 
Reinstate WWII-era Excess Profits Tax on Large Corporations Seeing Windfall Profits from Pandemic to 
Help Small Business Recovery, TAX NOTES, Dec. 18. 2020 (documenting that Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (HI-
02) called on Congress to impose an excess profits tax on large corporations like Amazon, Google, and 
Walmart that enjoyed significant profits due to the Coronavirus); Bianca Agustin et al., Billionaire Wealth 
vs. Community Health: Protecting Essential Workers from Pandemic Profiteers, TAX NOTES, 1, 25, Nov. 
2020(proposing an excess profits tax to discourage COVID-19 profiteering); Chuck Collins et al., 
Billionaire Bonanza 2020, Wealth Windfalls, Tumbling Taxes, and Pandemic Profiteers, INST. FOR POL’Y 
STUD. 1, 16 (Apr. 23, 2020) (recommending an excess profits tax due to the pandemic); and Allison 
Christians & Tarcísio Diniz Magalhães, It’s Time for Pillar 3: A Global Excess Profits Tax For COVID-
19 and Beyond, TAX NOTES INT’L, at 507, May 4, 2020 (suggesting that global excess profits taxes on 
companies profiteering from the pandemic will be more successful than individual countries imposing 
such tax). But see Joseph J. Thorndike, If the Pandemic Is a War Should We Consider a War Profits Tax?, 
TAX NOTES, 2023-26, Mar. 30, 2020 (suggesting that imposing an excess profits tax for purposes of 
COVID-19 is beyond the scope of Treasury’s intent in enacting it in the first place); George K. Yin, Is It 
Really Time for an Excess Profits Tax?, TAX NOTES, 833, May 4, 2020 (suggesting that arguments to 
impose an excess profits tax to combat the financial strain of COVID-19 are weak). 
 30. See infra Part II.A. 
 31. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 15 U.S.C. § 9001 (2020) [hereinafter 
CARES Act]. Note that the Taxpayer Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2020, enacted December 
27, 2020 as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 made significant changes and updates to 
the CARES Act. See also H.R. 133, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter, TCDTRA]. 
 32. Brian Soucek, Discriminatory Paycheck Protection, 11 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 319, 320 
(2020). 
 33. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at §§ 2301 – 2308. See also Thomas W. Joo & Alex Wheeler, 
The “Small Business” Myth of the Paycheck Protection Program, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 21, 25 
(2020) (addressing Congress’ response to the pandemic via the CARES Act), and Paul Holdsworth, 
Employment Law, 55 U. RICH. L. REV. 113, 119 (2020) (noting the relaxed tax provisions in the CARES 
Act §§ 2301-2302). 
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Soon after the pandemic’s onset, scholars began examining COVID-
19’s impact on commercial ventures. Such intellectual contributions 
include: (1) scrutinizing financial institutions’ ethical behaviors and 
cultural norms amidst the pandemic,34 (2) defending large business 
ventures taking advantage of the CARES Act PPP loans,35 (3) proposing 
metrics to allow franchise systems within the food and restaurant 
industries to better adjust to COVID-19 disruptions,36 (4) examining the 
PPP program from a First Amendment perspective,37 (5) exploring the 
enforceability of COVID-19 liability waivers on consumers and business 
owners,38 and (6) arguing against collegiate institutions hosting revenue-
generating sporting events while remaining academically virtual.39 
In addition to the proposal that Congress impose an excess profits tax 
on COVID-profiting enterprises, scholars have explored broader, tax-
specific issues stemming from COVID-19 disruptions. Such inquiries 
include analyzing flaws in the temporary suspension of deduction 
limitations on certain business tax losses under the CARES Act,40 
evaluating key tax provisions of the CARES Act with regard to employee 
benefit plans41 and business practices,42 and examining the function of the 
United States corporate income tax in pandemic-transformed business 
organizations.43  
This Article adds to the aforementioned literature as follows. First, this 
Article maintains that essential businesses are not responsible for the 
annihilation of numerous small businesses. Rather, such is a consequence 
of the executive action of state governors in response to the perceived 
threat of COVID-19.44  Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended (“Code”), for-profit enterprises are distinguishable from tax-
exempt organizations in that they are, among other factors, vested in being 
 
 34. Nizan Geslevich Packin, In Too-Big-To-Fail We Trust: Ethics and Banking In The Era Of 
Covid-19, 20 WIS. L. REV. 1043 (2020). 
 35. Joo & Wheeler, supra note 33. 
 36. Paul Brunkhorst, Contactless Currency During Covid-19: How The Pandemic’s Business 
Disruptions Will Change Franchise System Payment Standards, 40 FRANCHISE L.J. 259 (2020). 
 37. Soucek, supra note 32, at 319-20 (with particular attention paid to strip clubs). 
 38. Zahra Takhshid, Nonessential Businesses and Liability Waivers in the Time of COVID-19, 105 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 42 (2020). 
 39. Thomas A. Baker III et al., College Football In The Time Of COVID-19, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 
FORWARD 101 (2020). 
 40. Clint Wallace, The Troubling Case of the Unlimited Pass-Through Deduction: Section 2304 
of the CARES Act, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2020).  
 41. Samantha A. Kopacz & Samuel L. Parks, COVID-19 and Employee Benefit Plans: Congress 
and IRS Provide Taxpayer Relief Under Certain Plan Rules Due To Pandemic, 99 MI. BAR J. 24 (2020). 
 42. Scott E. Vincent, Pandemic Tax Developments, 76 J. MO. B. 126 (2020). 
 43. Mindy Herzfeld, Corporate Tax in the New Normal, TAX NOTES INT’L, June 1, 2020, at 981. 
 44. See infra Part I.C. 
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profitable,45 thereby enjoying unrestricted commercial activity.46 
Targeting already-thriving, large for-profit entities for profiting during 
the lockdowns fails to acknowledge the societal obligation that 
governments have to businesses that were forcibly restricted from 
engaging in commerce. 
In concert with this premise, this Article dismisses recent proposals to 
impose an excess profits tax on companies benefitting from pandemic 
lockdowns.47 Treasury introduced this tax during the previous World 
Wars in an effort to target businesses engaged in “war profiteering” 
amidst everyday Americans who otherwise sacrificed “life and limb.”48 
Mr. Trump’s and others’ wartime analogy to a War on COVID, akin to 
President Ronald Reagan’s War on Drugs,49 is mere rhetoric. Federal tax 
policy engenders that an excess profits tax “be used in time of war.”50 The 
United States judicial system defines "war” as a hostile engagement 
between nation[s], government[s], and the like.51 Suggesting that excess 
profits taxation be imposed on large companies benefitting from the 
COVID-19 pandemic contradicts historical tax policy in the United 
States. Further, this Article proposes that recent lawsuits, brought by 
injured businesses alleging Takings Clause claims against states that 
imposed lockdowns, will provide little meaningful relief.52 
Finally, this Article establishes that the CARES Act does not 
sufficiently remedy the financial devastation suffered by nonessential 
businesses as a result of state-mandated lockdowns.53 Instead, this Article 
suggests that an overriding public interest warrants significant radical tax 
 
 45. John Tyler et al., Producing Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of Hybrid 
Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 255 (2015). See also I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) 
(2021). 
 46. See infra Part III. 
 47. See infra Part II.C. 
 48. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Lawyers, Guns, and Public Moneys: The U.S. Treasury, World War I, and 
the Administration of the Modern Fiscal State, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 173, 185 (2010). See also Revenue 
Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 300 (1917). 
 49. See Peter Bowal et al., Regulating Cannabis: A Comparative Exploration of Canadian 
Legalization, AM. BUS. L. REV. (2021). 
 50. See Carl Shoup, The Federal Revenue System: The Excess Profits Tax, A Report to the 
Secretary of the Treasury, TAX HISTORY (Sept. 20, 1934), http://www.taxhistory.org 
/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23735/23735-1.htm. 
 51. See Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atlantic Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F. 3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 
2019) (citing to 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 152:3 (3rd ed. 2017) (defining “war”, in part, as  “the 
employment of force between governments or entities essentially like governments.”). See also Noasha 
LLC v. Nordic Group of Cos., 630 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 (E.D. Pa., 2009) (citing to THE COMPACT ED. OF 
THE OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY 3682 (26th Ed. 1987), which defined “war” as the “hostile contention by 
means of armed forces, carried between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or 
state.”). 
 52. See infra Part II.A. 
 53. See infra Part II.B. 
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reform, which will require Congress to reevaluate the manner in which it 
views non-profit organizations. Specifically, this Article proposes that 
certain, qualifying businesses forcibly locked down during the pandemic 
("COVID-Companies") should be provided temporary federal tax-exempt 
status, and any donations made to these entities should be treated as tax 
deductible.54 
To better address how the United States can make COVID-Companies 
whole again, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an 
evolutionary discussion of the negative spillover effects resulting from 
state-mandated lockdowns on business operations in the United States. 
Part II evaluates recent scholarly proposals to remedy or “fix” these 
harms. Part III recommends that Code section 501 be revised to provide 
temporary relief to nonessential businesses, akin to that enjoyed by tax 
exempt, non-profit organizations. Finally, this Article concludes that 
society has a vested interest in preserving and resurrecting nonessential 
businesses, and revolutionary tax reform is the means by which to 
effectuate nonessential businesses’ recoveries. 
I. THE MONUMENTAL HARM CAUSED BY THE LOCKDOWNS 
One of the earliest peer-reviewed articles to address the role of social 
distancing in mitigating pandemic influenza derived from a high school 
science fair project.55 While an abundance of scholarly research is 
dedicated to studying the function of social distancing to minimize 
contagion exposure,56 prior to 2020, only negligible consideration was 
given to the impact of social distancing on the restrictive free flow of 
commerce.57 In late 2019, while most people across the globe were doing 
 
 54. See infra Part III.C. 
 55. Robert J. Glass, et. al., Targeted Social Distancing Design for Pandemic Influenza, 12 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1671 (2006) (Laura M. Glass, one of the authors of this study, was a 
high school student at the time of publication). See also Ollie Reed Jr., Social distancing born in ABQ 
teen’s science project, ALBUQUERQUE J. (May 2, 2020) (on file with author). 
 56. See, e.g., Peter Caley et al., Quantifying social distancing arising from pandemic influenza, 5 
J. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y INTERFACE, 631-39 (Oct. 4, 2007) (studying the impact of social distancing 
amidst potentially infectious contacts); Harunor Rashid et al., Evidence compendium and advice on social 
distancing and other related measures for response to an influenza pandemic, 16 PAEDIATRIC 
RESPIRATORY REV. 119 (2015) (examining the role of social distancing against pandemic influenza); Duo 
Yu et al., Effects of reactive social distancing on the 1918 influenza pandemic, PLOS ONE 12(7) (2017); 
Joel K. Kelso et al., Simulation suggests that rapid activation of social distancing can arrest epidemic 
development due to a novel strain of influenza, 9 BMC PUB. HEALTH 117 (2009) (utilizing computer 
simulations to examine the extent and timing of social distancing measures to quench pandemic influenza 
spread); and Faruque Ahmed et al., Effectiveness of workplace social distancing measures in reducing 
influenza transmission: a systematic review, 18 BMC PUB. HEALTH 518 (2017) (analyzing the impact of 
social distancing in non-healthcare workplaces to slow influenza transmission). 
 57. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, 
at 4 (2007) (making a brief statement that pandemics may result in employee absences, changes to 
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anything but socially distancing in their personal or business endeavors, 
a novel coronavirus began silently spreading its way across Wuhan, 
China.58  
History supports that health-related pandemics and small-scale 
lockdowns are not societal novelties. What makes the COVID-19 
pandemic unique, from a commerce perspective, is its breadth of 
economic calamity, magnitude of residential and commercial lockdowns, 
and novel distinctions drawn between essential and nonessential business 
ventures under the law. Events that transpired after COVID-19 impacting 
the United States now require radical tax policy initiatives to rehabilitate 
the ensuing economic fallout. To appreciate this Article’s ultimate appeal 
that critical and revolutionary tax relief be granted to nonessential 
businesses forcibly closed by governmental mandates, Section A offers a 
brief narrative of the evolution of COVID-19. Section B discusses the 
history of mini-lockdowns and other minor suspensions previously 
instituted. Finally, Section C examines the effect of government 
lockdowns and other restrictions on America’s small businesses. 
A. A Virus Originating Seemingly From Nowhere 
The exact source of the COVID-19 virus was initially thought to 
originate from Wuhan, China’s Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market.59 
The first recorded cases of Wuhan patients with a suspicious disease 
presenting as an atypical pneumonia arose in early December  2019.60 
However, evidence suggests that the virus may have been circulating 
months prior.61 By New Year 2020 disturbing reports were emerging from 
China by its “citizen journalists” who then mysteriously disappeared from 
 
commerce, and interrupted supply chain). 
 58. See Jacques deLisle & Shen Kui, Lessons From China’s Response to COVID-19: 
Shortcomings, Successes, and Prospects for Reform in the Chinese Regulatory State, 16 U. PA. ASIAN L. 
REV. 66, 67 (2020). 
 59. Id. at 72-3 (noting the Seafood Market as the suspected source of the virus’ origination). But 
see James T. Areddy, China Rules Out Animal Market and Lab as Coronavirus Origin, WALL STREET J. 
(May 26, 2020, 4:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-rules-out-animal-market-and-lab-as-
coronavirus-origin-11590517508 (documenting that Chinese scientists dismissed suspicions that the 
coronavirus originated at the Wuhan Seafood Market, or in a laboratory as had otherwise been claimed). 
See also Ken Dilanian et al., Did the coronavirus really escape from a Chinese lab? Here’s what we know, 
NBCNEWS (May 4, 2020, 2:35 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/did-
coronavirus-really-escape-chinese-lab-here-s-what-we-n1199531 (discussing the coronavirus lab release 
theory). 
 60. deLisle & Kui, supra note 59, at 71. 
 61. Elaine Okanyene Nsoesie et al., Analysis of hospital traffic and search engine data in Wuhan 
China indicates early disease activity in the fall of 2019, HARV. LIBR. (2020), 
https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/42669767. 
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the public eye.62 Gruesome images showed people dying in streets,63 
infected residents sealed behind closed doors and left for dead,64 residents 
forcibly removed from their homes,65 portable crematory cover-ups,66 
 
 62. See Jan Li, Another citizen journalist covering the coronavirus has gone missing in Wuhan, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 12, 2020), https://qz.com/1801361/wuhan-virus-citizen-journalists-fang-bin-chen-qiushi-
go-missing/ (noting that a second Chinese citizen covering the coronavirus went missing after posting 
online videos from city hospitals); Vivian Wang, They Documented the Coronavirus Crisis in Wuhan. 
Then They Vanished, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/business/wuhan-
coronavirus-journalists.html (documenting that a Chinese amateur reporters went missing after posting 
unfiltered videos online of the devastating impact of the coronavirus); Guo Rui, Chinese citizen journalist 
detained after live-streaming on coronavirus from Wuhan, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 18, 2020), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3084882/chinese-citizen-journalist-detained-after-
live-streaming (reporting on the detainment of a Chinese citizen reporter following her criticism of the 
government’s handling of the virus). 
 63. Agence France-Presse, A man lies dead in the street: the image that captures the Wuhan 
coronavirus crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/31/a-
man-lies-dead-in-the-street-the-image-that-captures-the-wuhan-coronavirus-crisis; Mark Hodge, 
Coronavirus leaves Wuhan a 'zombieland' with people collapsing in streets and medics patrolling in 
hazmat suits, THE SUN (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10808633/coronavirus-wuhan-
zombieland/; Brendan McFadden, Coronavirus: Infected people seen 'dead in streets' in Chinese City 
dubbed 'zombieland', MIRROR (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10808633/coronavirus-
wuhan-zombieland/. 
 64. Nicola Stow, Sealed in Virus Tomb Coronavirus patients WELDED into homes in China as 
death toll spirals to 813, THE SUN (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.the-sun.com/news/378365/coronavirus-
patients-welded-into-homes-in-china-as-death-toll-spirals-to-813/; Huizhong Wu, Sealed in: Chinese 
trapped at home by coronavirus feel the strain, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-quarantine/sealed-in-chinese-trapped-at-home-by-
coronavirus-feel-the-strain-idUSKCN20G0AY; Faye Brown, Wuhan woman screams as Chinese 
authorities barricade her inside own home, METRO (Feb. 2, 2020), 
https://metro.co.uk/2020/02/02/wuhan-woman-screams-chinese-authorities-barricade-inside-home-
12162599/. 
 65. Minyvonne Burke et al., Video appears to show people in China forcibly taken for quarantine 
over coronavirus, ABC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/video-appears-
show-people-china-forcibly-taken-quarantine-over-coronavirus-n1133096; Eileen AJ Connelly, 
Coronavirus crisis: Video allegedly shows Chinese officials removing people from homes, N.Y. POST 
(Feb. 8, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/02/08/coronavirus-crisis-video-allegedly-shows-chinese-
officials-removing-people-from-homes/; Rory Sullivan, Coronavirus: Video from China shows 
screaming woman being placed in metal box by quarantine workers, INDEP. (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/coronavirus-quarantine-china-video-shanghai-wuhan-
watch-a9333566.html, Connor Boyd, Suspected coronavirus patient is wheeled out of a Chinese airport 
in a see-through quarantine box while flanked by medics wearing face masks, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 23, 
2020), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-7921351/Suspected-coronavirus-patient-wheeled-
Chinese-airport-quarantine-box.html. 
 66. Henry Holloway, China deploys 40 incinerators to Wuhan amid fears of coronavirus death 
toll 'cover up', DAILY STAR (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/world-news/china-
deploys-40-incinerators-wuhan-21529067; Bloomberg, Reports of Urns Stacked at Wuhan Funeral 
Homes Raises Questions about the Real Coronavirus Death Toll in China, TIME (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://time.com/5811222/wuhan-coronavirus-death-toll/; Spencer Neal, 'We can't stop': Funeral worker 
says Wuhan cremating 'at least 100' bodies a day amid coronavirus outbreak, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 5, 
2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/we-cant-stop-funeral-worker-says-wuhan-crematin 
g-at-least-100-bodies-a-day-amid-coronavirus-outbreak; Mai He et al., Cremation based estimates 
suggest significant under-and delayed reporting of Covid-19 epidemic data in Wuhan China, MEDRXIV 
(June 16, 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.05.28.20116012v2.article-info. 
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stacks of body bags,67 claims of patients being burned alive,68 medical 
personnel wearing full biohazard suits,69 and makeshift hospitals built in 
a matter of days to withstand the volume of sick and dying patients.70 All 
of these shocking and theatrical scenes were eerily reminiscent of the 
2011 horror movie, Contagion, where a bat virus originating in China 
made the biological leap from animals to humans before rapidly spreading 
across the globe.71 
In the latter part of January 2020, the world watched as Chinese 
governmental authorities shut down the once thriving Wuhan 
metropolis.72 Transportation into and out of Wuhan ceased, and large-
scale activities were cancelled.73 Commentators suggested China’s 
“sledgehammer” approach to its handling of the pandemic would be 
deemed unconstitutional in the United States, where individuals reap 
considerable civil liberties and human rights.74 Notwithstanding such 
rights and liberties, by April 2020, social distancing was the “new 
normal” in the United States.75–shelters-in-place ensued,76 in-school 
learning ceased,77 essential versus nonessential business categorizations 
 
 67. Footage of 'body bags' from inside Wuhan, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 10, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2020/2/10/footage-of-body-bags-from-inside-wuhan/; 
Robert Mann & Eliot Hastie, Killer Bug Chaos Man arrested after filming covert video showing true scale 
of body bags piling up at Wuhan hospital, THE SUN (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.the-
sun.com/news/346486/man-arrested-for-filming-body-bags-and-staff-in-hazmat-suits-at-wuhan-
hospital-treating-patients-with-deadly-coronavirus/; Coronavirus: Body-bag stocks 'in danger of running 
out', BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2020); https://www.bbc.com/news/health-52205655. 
 68. Keoni Everington, Chinese woman describes Wuhan virus patients being burned alive, 
TAIWAN NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://thewatchtowers.org/watch-chinese-woman-describes-wuhan-
virus-patients-being-burned-alive-taiwan-news/. 
 69. Spencer Neal, WATCH: Doctors in hazmat suits treat patients with deadly coronavirus, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/watch-hazmat-clad-doctors-
treat-patients-with-deadly-coronavirus. 
 70. Yuliya Talmazan, China's coronavirus hospital built in 10 days opens its doors, state media 
says, NBC NEWS (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-s-coronavirus-hospital-
built-10-days-opens-its-doors-n1128531. 
 71. CONTAGION (Participant Media, Image Nation Abu Dhabi, Double Feature Films 2011). 
 72. deLisle & Kui, supra note 59, at 76. 
 73. Coronavirus: Wuhan shuts public transport over outbreak, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51215348. 
 74. James Hamblin, A Historic Quarantine, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/01/china-quarantine-coronavirus/605455/. 
 75. See Charles Courtemanche et al., Strong Social Distancing Measures In The United States 
Reduced The COVID-19 Growth Rate, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/10.1377/hlthaff.2020.00608. 
 76. State “Shelter-in-Place” and “Stay-at-Home” Orders, FINRA, https://live-
thornton2020.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2020-03-State-Stay-at-Home-Guidelines.pdf 
(last visited October 21, 2021). 
 77. School responses to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic during the 2019-2020 academic 
year, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/School_responses_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-
19)_pandemic_during_the_2019-2020_academic_year (last visited Jan. 5, 2021). 
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mysteriously arose,78 and all commercial ventures identified as 
nonessential closed.79 While government mandated lockdowns were 
virtually unheard of in modern United States history, they evolved from 
a lengthy history of small-scale lockdowns imposed globally. 
B. A History of Mini-Lockdowns and Other Suspensions  
History suggests that as early as the 17th Century Italian Renaissance, 
lockdowns were implemented to guard against pandemic health 
emergencies, terrorism, and industrial cataclysms.80 For example, in an 
effort to contain the 1630 plague, Florence, Italy went into lockdown, 
with individuals forced to stay home.81 When the 1665 bubonic plague 
emerged in London, the city similarly went into lockdown.82 During the 
1800s cholera outbreak, ships were barred entry into European ports, 
contact with known-infected persons resulted in mass quarantining, 
restrictions were placed on those wanting to enter urban locations, and 
officials limited the mobility of beggars and prostitutes, who were 
considered carriers of the disease.83 
The Spanish Flu, which has been increasingly likened to the COVID-
19 pandemic,84 endured lesser prohibitive measures than the 2020 
lockdowns.85 Although the federal government did not institute a 
 
 78. Essential vs. Nonessential Businesses, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/covid-19/business-
assistance-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic/essential-vs-nonessential-businesses/ (last visited Jan. 7, 
2021). 
 79. Kelly Deere & Christine Gottesman, We Can Do This: Reopening the Non-Public Office Sector 
and Keeping it Open During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 16 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 10, 12 (2020). 
 80. See Dhananjay Khadilkar, 17th-century Florence: When lockdown became the template to 
fight pandemics, RFI (July 4, 2020), https://www.rfi.fr/en/europe/20200407-17th-century-florence-when-
lockdown-became-the-template-to-fight-pandemics-coronavirus-covid-19-plague. See also Ramin 
Jahanbegloo, Life lessons from the history of lockdowns, LIVEMINT (updated Mar. 27, 2020), https 
://www.livemint.com/news/india/life-lessons-from-the-history-of-lockdowns-11585312953744.html. 
 81. Khadilkar, id. 
 82. ‘Lockdown’ was used during the Great Plague, NEWS LETTER (Nov. 16, 2020), 
https://www.newsletter.co.uk/arts-and-culture/film-and-tv/lockdown-was-used-during-great-plague-
3037488. 
 83. Eugenia Tognotti, Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A, 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 254, 255-56 (2013). 
 84. See, e.g., E. Lars Phillips & Lucas Hamilton, Coronavirus In Montana: Quarantine Authority 
In Montana, 45 MONT. LAW. 12, 14 (2020) (noting the Spanish Flu forced public, religious, and business 
closures similar to the COVID movement); COVID-19’s Next Victim? The Rights Of The Accused, DUBIN 
RES. AND CONSULTING, 44 CHAMPION 22, 23 (2020) (noting the Spanish Flu provided some legal 
precedent to the COVID-19 pandemic); Russell Lewis et al., COVID-19 Force Majeure To The Rescue?, 
56 TENN. B.J. 20, 20 (2020) (referencing that the Spanish Flu was the “most challenging epidemic” prior 
to the emergence of COVID-19). 
 85. Francois R. Velde, What Happened to the US Economy During the 1918 Influenza Pandemic? 
A View Through High-Frequency at 37 (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2020-11, Apr. 2020), 
https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2020/2020-11. 
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nationwide lockdown in 1918, select cities took varied actions to “flatten 
the curve”.86 In St. Louis, Missouri the health commissioner closed 
schools, movie theaters, and social halls while banning public 
gatherings.87 In San Francisco, mask mandates became law, with fines 
imposed for failure to wear face coverings in public.88 Violet Harris, a 15 
year old living in Seattle, Washington, documented her six week 
lockdown experience and was delighted once her school finally 
reopened.89 
Estimates suggest that 500 million people were infected with the 
Spanish Flu worldwide, and between 50 and 100 million people 
perished.90 Adjusted for today’s current population, this death toll equates 
to between 175 and 350 million deaths.91 In the United States alone, 
approximately 675,000 people died.92  
More recently, in 2003 Toronto, Canada issued a city-wide lockdown, 
closed nonessential businesses, implemented social distancing measures, 
and required at least 13,000 people to quarantine in an effort to curb 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).93 President Dr. Ernest Bai 
Koroma issued a three-day lockdown in Sierra Leone in 2014 amidst the 
Ebola outbreak. 94 Ebola also resulted in the closure of  governmental 
offices in Liberia for 30 days, schools in Nigeria for 43 days, as well as 
schools and universities indefinitely in Guinea until the outbreak was 
under control.95  
Brussels, Belgium locked down in 2015 after a series of terrorist 
attacks in Paris.96 For a brief period, the city’s metro system closed, 
 
 86. David Roos, How U.S. Cities Tried to Halt the Spread of the 1918 Spanish-Flu, HIST. (updated 
Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/spanish-flu-pandemic-response-cities. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Noah Y. Kim, How the 1918 Pandemic Frayed Social Bonds, THE ATL. (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-loneliness-and-mistrust-1918-flu-
pandemic-quarantine/609163/. 
 90. 1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus), CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemic-h1n1.html (last visited July 24, 2020). 
 91. John M. Berry, 1918 Revised: Lessons and Suggestions for Further Inquiry, in THE THREAT 
OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ARE WE READY? 58, 58 (Knobler et al. eds. 2005) (adjustment based on 1918 
population, which was 28 percent of the current population). 
 92. Jeffery K. Taubenberger, Chasing the Elusive 1918 Virus: Preparing for the Future by 
Examining the Past, in THE THREAT OF PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: ARE WE READY? 69, 69 (Knobler et al. 
eds. 2005). 
 93. Jeff St. Clair, Toronto’s SARS Outbreak Provides a Cautionary Tale of Lifting a Lockdown 
Too Soon, WKSU (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.wksu.org/post/torontos-sars-outbreak-provides-
cautionary-tale-lifting-lockdown-too-soon#stream/0. See also James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Efficacy In 
Emergency Legal Preparedness Underlying The 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 353 (2015) 
(documenting the number of people quarantined in Toronto). 
 94. ADNAN I. QURESHI, EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE: FROM ORIGIN TO OUTBREAK 188 (2016). 
 95. Hodge, Jr. et. al., supra note 94, at 360-61. 
 96. Jasmine Coleman, Brussels lockdown: How is city affected by terror threat?, BBC (Nov. 24, 
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residents were asked to avoid gatherings, restaurants and cafes closed 
early, and soldiers patrolled the streets amidst warnings of “serious and 
imminent” terrorist attacks.97 In 2019, a one month lockdown was 
imposed on a Russian naval base following an accidental missile 
explosion.98 Certainly, brief lockdowns of military bases, governmental 
offices, and schools in the United States have become the norm following 
active or potential shooter incidents.99 While each of these instances are 
critical to understanding the efficacy of emergency preparedness across 
numerous fronts, none of these historic examples come close to 
paralleling the unprecedented magnitude of global lockdowns resulting 
from COVID-19, and the financial calamity that followed. 
C. Locking Down the Nonessentials 
The first mandatory COVID-19 lockdown was recorded on January 23, 
2020, in three Chinese cities: Wuhan, Ezhou, and Huanggang.100 Referred 
to as the “Wuhan lockdown,” the Chinese central government levied the 
“largest attempted cordon sanitaire in human history,” unknowingly 
creating a framework for globally mandated closures that included travel 
bans and business cessations.101 On that date, Wuhan had only 495 
positive COVID-19 cases.102 The next day, China instituted lockdowns in 
twelve additional cities, and by January 28, 2020, a total of seventeen 
cities in the country were forcibly shut down.103 As a result, trains and bus 
systems were suspended, temperature detection centers were established, 
cafes, theaters and exhibitions closed, gatherings were cancelled, and 
 
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34900353. 
 97. Ben Taub, Belgian Terror: Brussels On Lockdown, THE NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/belgian-terror-brussels-on-lockdown. 
 98. Oli Smith, What is Putin hiding? Emergency lockdown of Russian base after ‘nuclear missile’ 
accident, EXPRESS (Aug. 10, 2019), https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1163716/Russia-latest-news-
Putin-military-explosion-nuclear-missile-radiation-leak-world-war-3. 
 99. See, e.g., Carl Prine, Threats trigger lockdown at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, NAVY 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/12/11/suspect-in-custody-at-
naval-air-station-corpus-christi/; Virginia Beach shooting: 12 killed after city worker opens fire at 
colleagues, BBC (June 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48481814; and Gwen 
Filosa, Three Key West schools were put on lockdown as police search for a student, MIAMI HERALD 
(Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/florida-keys/article24789 
3855.html. 
 100. Global COVID-19 Lockdown Tracker, AURA VISION (last updated June 11, 2020), 
https://auravision.ai/covid19-lockdown-tracker/. 
 101. Rui Bao & Acheng Zhang, Does lockdown reduce air pollution? Evidence from 44 cities in 
northern China, 731 SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 1, 2 (2020). 
 102. Chong You et al., An Estimation of the Total Number of Cases of NCIP (2019-nCoV) – Wuhan, 
Hubei Province, 2019-2020, 2 CHINA CDC WEEKLY 6, at 87 (2020), 
http://weekly.chinacdc.cn/fileCCDCW/journal/article/ccdcw/2020/6/PDF/2019-nCoV-en.pdf. 
 103. Global Covid-19 Lockdown Tracker, supra note 101. 
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masks became mandatory.104 Virtually overnight, food became scarce, 
streets emptied, and Lunar New Year festivities were cancelled.105 
It took slightly over a month before the first European country 
announced a shutdown. On March 9, 2020, Italy issued a national 
lockdown.106 Schools and universities closed, visitors were banned from 
prisons, sporting events and outdoor gatherings were forbidden, curfews 
ensued, pubs closed, and travel restrictions were enforced.107 Italy’s 
ventilator crisis unfolded across television screens as the world 
watched.108 Countries around the globe reacted swiftly by instituting 
lockdowns, including in Europe, South America, Australia, the 
Philippines, and the Caribbean.109 
Puerto Rico was the first United States territory to institute a lockdown 
on March 15, 2020.110 Puerto Ricans were required, by executive order, 
to remain indoors for two weeks, with an overnight curfew beginning at 
nine o’clock.111 Violators were subject to a maximum fine of $5,000 or 
six months imprisonment.112 Most businesses were also forcibly shut 
down, with exceptions granted to grocers, pharmacies, medical 
equipment companies, carry-out dining, gas stations, and banks.113 
The first state in the United States to institute a move was California. 
On March 4, 2020, Governor Gavin Newsom declared a State of 
Emergency.114 The announcement came one week after Orange County 
officials declared health and local emergencies, without any recorded 
cases in the area at the time.115 On March 16, 2020, seven Bay area 
counties issued "shelter-in-place" orders, demanding that millions of 
residents stay in their homes, with exceptions granted to certain essential 
 
 104. China coronavirus: Lockdown measures rise across Hubei province, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51217455. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Jason Horowitz, Italy Announces Restrictions Over Entire Country in Attempt to Halt 
Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/europe/italy-
lockdown-coronavirus.html. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Daniel M. Horn, How America Can Avoid Italy’s Ventilator Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22/opinion/health/ventilator-shortage-coronavirus-solution. 
html. 
 109. Global Covid-19 Lockdown Tracker, supra note 101.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Edmy Ayala & Patricia Mazzei, Puerto Rico Orders Coronavirus Lockdown. Violators Could 
Be Fined., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/us/coronavirus-puerto-
rico.html. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Staff, Timeline: California reacts to coronavirus, CALMATTERS (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://calmatters.org/health/coronavirus/2020/04/gavin-newsom-coronavirus-updates-timeline/. 
 115. Id. 
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services and the homeless.116 
As more counties in the United States adopted shelter-in-place orders, 
Newsom issued the first statewide shelter-in-place order on March 19, 
2020.117 His Executive Order N-33-20, which cited to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity & Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA), designated certain critical infrastructures as 
having a “special responsibility” to remain operational during the 
pandemic.118 The CISA lists sixteen critical infrastructure units that are 
“imperative during the response to the COVID-19 emergency” for public 
health, safety, and community well-being.119 Around the same time 
period, Mr. Trump issued a memorandum documenting, in relevant part, 
“if you work in a critical infrastructure industry, as defined by the 
Department of Homeland Security, such as healthcare services and 
pharmaceutical and food supply, you have a special responsibility to 
maintain your normal work schedule.”120 
Newsom’s Executive Order indicated that categorized units identified 
by the CISA are “so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or 
destruction could have a debilitating effect on security, economic 
security, public health or safety…” thus requiring that these businesses 
remain operational during the closure.121 All businesses falling outside of 
such were ordered closed. Those refusing to abide by the Order were 
subject to a misdemeanor and fines up to $1,000, six months 
imprisonment, or both.122 
 
 116. Julia Wick, Newsletter: Shelter-in-place orders in seven Bay Area counties, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
17, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/newsletter/2020-03-17/shelter-in-place-coronavirus-bay-
area-newsletter-essential-california (Essential businesses permitted to remain open included police and 
fire departments, hospitals, grocers, gas stations, banks, pharmacies, and carry-out restaurants). Id. 
 117. See Exec. Order No. 33-20, supra note 3. 
 118. See Exec. Order No. 33-20, supra note 3 See also Advisory Memorandum On Identification Of 
Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers During COVID-19 Response, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC. 
(May 19, 2020), https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Version_3.1_CISA_Guidance_on 
_Essential_Critical_Infrastructure_Workers_0.pdf (the sixteen essential critical infrastructure workers 
include: Communications, Chemical, Critical Manufacturing, Commercial Facilities, Dams, Defense 
Industrial Base, Emergency Service, Energy, Financial, Government Facilities, Food & Agriculture, 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials & Waste, Information Technology, Water, Transportations Systems, and 
Healthcare & Public Health).  
 119. See id. 
 120. See Loren Wolff & Catherine Gorman, Impact of The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency’s Memorandum on Identification of Essential Critical 




 121. Exec. Order No. 33-20, supra note 3 (In addition, the Order states that Governor Newsom 
“may designate additional sectors as critical in order to protect the health and well-being of all 
Californians”). Id. 
 122. Id. See also Cal. Gov’t Code § 8665 (1983). 
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Following California’s stay-at-home order, a cascade of states quickly 
followed including Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Ohio, New York, and Virginia.123 Only seven states withheld from issuing 
such orders.124 Each jurisdiction that executed a stay-at-home order 
likewise created various distinctions between essential versus 
nonessential operations.125 While each state’s definition of “essential” 
(allowed to operate) as compared to “nonessential” (not allowed to 
operate) varied, many jurisdictions utilized the CISA guidance.126 
Violators of these orders faced criminal misdemeanor penalties, fines, 
and imprisonment.127 In May 2020, for example, a Dallas, Texas beauty 
salon owner was jailed for opening her business in defiance of the state 
emergency order.128 That same month, in Camden, New Jersey, a gym 
owner was arrested following a series of citations for refusing to comply 
with the state’s closure.129 Even Elon Musk reopened his Tesla factory 
 
 123. Rosie Perper et al., More than half of the US population is now under orders to stay at home 
– here’s a list of coronavirus lockdowns in US states and cities, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 1, 2020,), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/states-cities-shutting-down-bars-restaurants-concerts-curfew-2020-3. 
 124. States that did not issue stay-at-home orders, supra note 20. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Defining critical industries, essential, and nonessential businesses, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Status_of_lockdown_and_stay-at-
home_orders_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020#Defining_critical_ 
industries.2C_essential.2C_and_nonessential_businesses (last visited Feb. 17, 2021). See also, e.g., Exec. 
Order No. 2020-21, STATE OF MICH. OFF. OF THE GOV. (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MIEOG/2020/03/23/file_attachments 
/1408152/EO%202020-21%20Stay%20Home,%20Stay%20Safe.pdf; Exec. Order No. 7H, STATE OF 
CONN. BY HIS EXCELLENCY NED LAMONT (Mar. 20, 2020), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Office-of-the-
Governor/Executive-Orders/Lamont-Executive-Orders/Executive-Order-No-7H.pdf?la=en; Executive 
Order 20-08; STATE OF IND. EXEC. DEP’T INDIANAPOLIS (Mar. 23, 2020), 
https://www.in.gov/gov/files/Executive_Order_20-08_Stay_at_Home.pdf; Exec. Order No. 20-03-30-01, 
ORDER OF THE GOV. OF THE STATE OF MD. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://governor.maryland.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/Gatherings-FOURTH-AMENDED-3.30.20.pdf; and Exec. Order No. 2020-21, 
STATE OF S. C. EXEC. DEP’T (Apr. 6, 2020), https://governor.sc.gov/sites/default/files 
/Documents/Executive-Orders/2020-04-06%20eFILED%20Executive%20Order%20No.%202020-
21%20-%20Stay%20at%20Home%20or%20Work%20Order.pdf. 
 127. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 121, STATE OF N.C. (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://files.nc.gov/governor/documents/files/EO121-Stay-at-Home-Order-3.pdf (violations may be 
subject to prosecution under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 166A-19.30(d), and punishable as a misdemeanor under 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.20A); Emergency Order #12, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T. OF HEALTH SERV. (Mar. 
24,2020), https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EMO12-SaferAtHome.pdf (violations punishable 
by imprisonment, fine, or both per Wis. Stat. § 252.25); and Exec. Order No. 20-12, OFF. OF THE GOV. 
STATE OF OR. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://govsite-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
jkAULYKcSh6DoDF8wBM0_EO%2020-12.pdf (violations are subject to penalties described in ORS 
401.990). 
 128. Emma Platoff, How a Dallas salon owner changed Texas’ reopening debate, TEX. TRIBUNE 
(May 15, 2020), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/05/15/texas-reopening-shelley-luther-dallas-salon-
owner/. 
 129. Christine Holbert, N.J. coronavirus recovery: Atilis Gym owners arrested for defying judge’s 
order, WHYY (July 27, 2020), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-coronavirus-recovery-atilis-gym-owners-
arrested-for-disregarding-judges-order/. 
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production line in defiance of Alameda County’s shelter-in-place order, 
later prompting the billionaire’s decision to relocate Tesla’s headquarters 
to Texas.130  
Amidst the increasing phenomenon surrounding state-mandated 
closures, there appeared at the outset to be minimal federal 
encouragement to issue such orders. In fact, most news reports from 
March and April 2020 indicate that Mr. Trump encouraged “shuttered 
businesses to reopen.”131 Meanwhile, the Executive Office designated the 
Department of Homeland Security to identify critical businesses that 
should remain open during the pandemic and encouraged people to work 
from home when possible.132 
While characterizing essential versus nonessential businesses was left 
to the states,133 on May 19, 2020, the CISA published an updated advisory 
memorandum, listing specific businesses that might fall within the critical 
infrastructure workforce of the United States. However, the memo noted 
that the list was not “a federal directive or standard” and “individual 
jurisdictions should add or subtract essential workforce categories based 
on their own requirements and discretion.”134 States thus made 
independent determinations, resulting in a clash of business 
categorizations across the nation. Almost immediately, scholars began 
opining on remedies to save the nonessentials, while Congress passed the 
CARES Act in an attempt to “fix” the United States economy. 
 
 130. Sean O’Kane, Elon Must defies coronavirus order and asks to be arrested, THE VERGE (May 
11, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/5/11/21255149/elon-musk-tesla-fremont-factory-reopen-
order-arrest-alameda. See also Sissi Cao, Why Elon Musk And Other Tach Billionaires Are Leaving 
Silicon Valley For Texas, OBSERVER (Dec. 15, 2020), https://observer.com/2020/12/elon-musk-tech-
leaving-silicon-valley-for-texas-billionaires/. 
 131. See Philip Rucker et al., Trump says he may soon push businesses to reopen, defying the advice 
of coronavirus experts, THE WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.washington 
post.com/politics/trump-says-he-may-soon-lift-restrictions-to-reopen-businesses-defying-the-advice-of-
coronavirus-experts/2020/03/23/f2c7f424-6d14-11ea-a3ec-70d7479d83f0_story.html. See also Michael 
D. Shear & Sarah Mervosh, Trump Encourages Protest Against Governors Who Have Imposed Virus 
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/17/us/politics/trump-
coronavirus-governors.html; Christopher Rugaber & Lori Hinnant, US job losses mount as Trump presses 
plan to reopen business, AP NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-us-news-ap-
top-news-international-news-virus-outbreak-1c0c92ce66ddba8dd88a4c66d83506be;  and Addy Baird, 
Trump Suggested Businesses Might Open Again Soon, Defying Public Health Experts, BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/addybaird/trump-open-business-soon-
coronavirus-weeks. 
 132. See Coronavirus Guidance for America, supra note 121. 
 133. See Ari Natter, Businesses Lobby to Make Trump’s List of ‘Essential’ Industries, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-14/-essential-label-stirs-business-
frenzy-to-make-trump-s-list (noting the differences across state lines of what is deemed “essential”). 
 134. Supra note 119. 
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II. PROPOSED LOCKDOWN REMEDIES AND OTHER "FIXES" 
In the Spring of 2020 when state-mandated closures reached their peak, 
approximately 140,000 businesses in the United States were shut down.135 
By August of 2020, reopenings resulted in a comparatively smaller 
number of closures. However, almost 98,000 businesses had already 
permanently shuttered.136 These extensive closures were a result of state 
and local governments’ exercising police powers to regulate businesses 
during the health emergency.137 
Various reactions to the pandemic raise important questions regarding 
the constitutionality of such closures,138 particularly with respect to police 
powers and due process rights. While outside the scope of this Article to 
evaluate the constitutionality of forced closures, it is important to consider 
whether business owners are entitled to "just compensation" after their 
property was "taken" by the government, and whether such a premise is a 
realistic vehicle for uniform relief. In addition, Congress’ enactment of 
the CARES Act raises important questions as to whether such rapidly 
produced legislation adequately targeted nonessential businesses. Finally, 
scholarly proposals to implement an excess profits tax on companies 
profiting from COVID-19 policies contradicts historical tax policy in the 
United States. To better appraise these issues, Section A examines the 
constitutional arguments in support of nonessential businesses shuttered 
during the lockdowns. Section B evaluates whether the CARES Act really 
“cared.” Finally, Section C demonstrates that Mr. Trump’s and others’ 
use of the term “war” in reference to the COVID-19 pandemic is merely 
a metaphor to describe the challenges facing the country, rather than an 
actual claim that the United States is at war.139 
A. Taking From the Nonessential Without Just Compensation 
The United States Supreme Court has supported the use of state police 
powers as far back as 1824, when Chief Justice John Marshall in Gibbons 
v. Ogden identified police powers as “that immense mass of legislation, 
which embraces everything within the territory of a state, not surrendered 
 
 135. Sraders & Lambert, supra note 25. 
 136. Id. (By August 2020, state-mandated closures reduced business closures to 65,769). 
 137. See Schiffer Hicks Johnson, Government-Mandated Closures: Who is Liable If Businesses 
Fail?, JDSUPRA (July 23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/government-mandated-closures-
who-is-34495/#_ftn1. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See Constanza Musu, War metaphors used for COVID-19 are compelling but also dangerous, 
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 8, 2020), https://theconversation.com/war-metaphors-used-for-covid-19-are-
compelling-but-also-dangerous-135406. 
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to the general government.”140 Chief Justice Marshall further 
acknowledged “that inspection laws, quarantine laws, and health laws of 
every description…” fall within the purview of state powers.141 Valid 
state police powers include laws and regulations enacted with the intent 
to secure and improve the population’s health and safety,142 and authority 
to enforce such laws generally resides with the governor.143 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue of mandatory 
communicable disease quarantining.144 Nevertheless, in the 1905 
Supreme Court case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court ruled on the 
issue of mandatory vaccinations, thus providing some minimal 
guidance.145 The defendant in that case appealed a Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decision holding that the state’s smallpox vaccination 
mandate was constitutional.146 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision, stating, in relevant part: 
[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every 
person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint…a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic 
of disease which threatens the safety of its members.147 
Notably, however, the Jacobson Court also stressed the need for courts to 
intervene when state police powers are “exercised in particular 
circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, 
unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what is reasonably 
required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts 
to interfere for the protection of such persons.”148 Notwithstanding such, 
the courts have generally conceded to public health authorities or 
legislatures in enforcing public health decisions with minimal 
exceptions.149 It is, however, feasible that select state governors exceeded 
 
 140. 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Theory And Practice In the Constitutional Design, 11 
HEALTH MATRIX 265, 285 (2001). 
 143. Maggie Davis et al., Calling Their Own Shots: Governors’ Emergency Declarations During 
The COVID-19 Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 95, 97 (2020). 
 144. Edward P. Richards, A Historical Review of the State Police Powers and Their Relevance to 
the COVID-19 Pandemic of 2020, 11 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 83, 101 (2020). 
 145. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 146. Id. at 23. 
 147. Id. at 26-28. 
 148. Id. at 28. 
 149. Richards, supra note 145, at 83-4. See also, e.g., Hartman v. May, 151 So. 737, 739 (Miss. 
1934) (granting discretion to public health authorities in mandating smallpox vaccinations for those 
attending public schools); Booth v. Bd. of Educ., 70 S.W. 2d 350, 353 (Tex. App. 1934) (In affirming a 
lower court’s decision supporting a Texas Board of Education’s decision requiring that public school 
students be vaccinated, the Court stated, “we [the Court] cannot attempt to measure how pressing a 
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their police power discretion when imposing lockdowns.  Only history 
will tell whether such actions were reasonable, and not arbitrary, in light 
of the public health threat.150 
When evaluating the legitimacy of state police powers within the 
context of COVID-19, scholar Edward Richards notes, “when fear is 
great, the public supports intrusive public health actions. When fear 
wanes… support wanes and officials hesitate to employ the police 
powers.”151 Richards does, however, acknowledge a peculiar 
phenomenon with regard to the recent coronavirus pandemic, observing 
that some courts chose to circumvent Jacobson, substituting their own 
judgment over that of public officials.152 Still, for more than 200 years a 
state's authority to regulate and protect public health has been legally 
sustained,153 and thus far Jacobson remains the leading decision on the 
appropriate legal standard when assessing the exercise of state police 
powers.154 
Within the milieu of COVID-19, it may prove challenging to question 
the validity of states’ actions to close nonessential businesses under the 
color of their protected police powers, absent evidence of arbitrary and 
unreasonable orders, or a Supreme Court overhaul of Jacobson.155 The 
courts have historically hesitated to apply the Due Process and Takings 
Clauses of the United States Constitution when governmental action takes 
 
necessity must be in order to allow the board’s discretion to be exercised.”); and Spokane County Health 
Dist. v. Brockett, 120 Wn.2d 140, 149 (1992) (noting that “the subject matter and expediency of public 
health disease prevention measures are ‘beyond judicial control, except as they may violate some 
constitutional right guaranteed to [defendants].” 
 150. See James Gallagher & Kevin Kiley v. Galvin Newsom, No. CVCS20-0912 (Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct. Nov. 2, 2020)(holding that Newsom’s Executive Order regarding elections was 
unconstitutional as he exercised legislative power in violation of the separation of powers. The governor 
was further enjoined and prohibited from exercising any power under the California Emergency Services 
Act which amends, alters or changes existing statutory law or makes new statutory law or legislative 
policy). 
 151. Id. at 104-05 (citing to Milton J. Rosenau, The Uses of Fear in Preventive Medicine, 162 BOS. 
MED. & SUR. J. 305 (1910). 
 152. Id. at 105. See also, e.g., Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F. 3d 1171(11th Cir. 2020) (in 
finding that the state of Alabama had not made a “strong showing that is likely to succeed on its merits” 
with regard to its suspension of medical procedures, including abortions, during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
the Court found that Jacobson “was not an absolute blank check for the exercise of governmental power”). 
Id. at 1179. See also Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(“Jacobson hardly supports cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic”). Id. at 212. But see Roman 
Catholic, 141 S. Ct. at 79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Justices of this Court play a deadly game in second 
guessing the expert judgment of health officials.”). 
 153. See Michele Goodwin, Pandemic Constitutional Rights: Not An All-Or-Nothing Proposition, 
46 S.F. ATT’Y 28, 30 (2020). 
 154. Stephanie Wylie, The Supreme Court Should Not Politicize Valid Public Health Orders, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020 
/09/02/489964/supreme-court-not-politicize-valid-public-health-orders/. 
 155. See Jeffrey D. Jackson, Tiered Scrutiny In A Pandemic, 12 CONLAWNOW 39, 44 (2020). 
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the form of property regulation pursuant to state police powers.156 
However, if state police powers are called into question, as observed 
recently in Robinson v. Attorney General and Roman Catholic Diocese v. 
Cuomo,157 the next examination is whether states’ orders to shutter 
businesses categorized as nonessential, while allowing essential 
businesses to thrive, pass constitutional scrutiny.158 
One of the principal civil rights guaranteed to persons in the United 
States is their right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment, which applies 
to federal action, specifically states, in relevant part, “no person shall…be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law….”159 
The Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to individual state actions, 
similarly denotes, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law…"160 In coalition with these due 
process protections, the Takings Clause indicates that property cannot be 
taken for public use “without just compensation."161 Thus, when persons 
are forcibly deprived of their own private property for public use, they are 
entitled to fair compensation.162 
In the 1960 Supreme Court case, Armstrong v. United States, Justice 
Hugo Black wrote that the Takings Clause “was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole."163 More than sixty years later, Justice Black’s sentiment has been 
extensively supported by scholars and courts as the decisive construal of 
Takings Clause policy.164 It is here, within the sphere of Armstrong 
 
 156. National Western Life Ins. Co. v. Commodore Cove Imp. Dist., 678 F.2d 24 (1982). 
 157. See Robinson v. Attorney General, 957 F. 3d 1171(11th Cir. 2020); Roman Catholic Diocese 
v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020). It is important to note that neither of these cases dealt with nonessential 
businesses being closed. In Robinson, the Court examined the legitimacy of abortion procedure 
suspensions in Alabama during the pandemic, while in Roman Catholic the Court reviewed whether in-
person capacity restrictions on religious houses of worship were violative of plaintiffs’ right to free action 
during the pandemic when such capacity impositions were not put on stores, factories, and schools. 
 158. Johnson, supra note 138. 
 159. U.S. Const. amend. V (emphasis added). See also Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use Paradox and 
the Takings Clause, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 9, 9 (1993) (noting that the 5th 
Amendment applies to federal actions). 
 160. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (emphasis added). See also Laitos, supra note 160 (documenting 
that the 14th Amendment applies to state-level actions). 
 161. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
 162. See Laitos, supra note 160, at 9. 
 163. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice 
And Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice And The Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 574 
(2007). 
 164. Kenneth J. Sanney, Balancing The Friction: How A Constitutional Challenge To Copyright 
Law Could Realign The Takings Clause Of the Fifth Amendment, 15 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 323, 
342 (2014). See also, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
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dogma, that aptly lays the starting point for analyzing whether states’ 
categorical decisions to forcibly close nonessential businesses were 
constitutional. It is also here where the authors suggest, from a tax policy 
standpoint, that fairness and justice warrant the protection of COVID-
Companies, as the public as a whole should bear the economic burden of 
the lockdowns and not specific businesses.165 
Amidst the various Spring 2020 lockdowns enacted by governors, 
nonessential businesses alone, in most states, bore the public burden of 
succumbing to forced closures.166 Property held by these businesses was, 
in essence, seized by the states after mandated closures went into effect, 
as business assets could no longer be commercially utilized, and the sale 
or lease of any such assets was impractical.167 While Justice Black made 
clear that not "every destruction or injury to property by governmental 
action has been held to be a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense,"168 
similarities can certainly be drawn between the petitioner lien holders in 
Armstrong and nonessential business owners harmed by state lockdowns. 
In Armstrong, the lien holders were entitled to recover the value of their 
liens after the United States government took title to a shipbuilder’s boats 
and materials following a contract default.169 Prior to the default, the 
petitioner-lien holders maintained regular, viable commercial enterprises 
whereby they furnished materials to the shipbuilder, which the 
shipbuilder then used to construct boats.170 When the government 
 
(2002) (finding no justification to create a new per se takings rule); Nat’l Board of YMCA v. United 
States, 395 U.S. 85, 89, 92 (1969) (finding that when a private party is a particular beneficiary of 
governmental activity, “fairness and justice” do not require that losses attributable to that activity “be 
borne by the public as a whole”); and Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 691 (1981) (upholding 
the Takings Clause as dogma in stating that the government must pay just compensation when “it furthers 
the Nation’s foreign policy goals by using as ‘bargaining chips’ claims lawfully held by a relatively few 
persons…”). See also, James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Weighing the Need to Establish Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine to Justify Takings Standards of Review and Principles, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 315, 332 (2010) (noting, “It is well settled that the Armstrong doctrinal statement [“The Fifth 
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation 
was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”] is a firm, resilient measure of Armstrong’s 
ability to contribute a substantive purpose and intent to takings disputes.”). Id. (citing to Armstrong, 364 
U.S. 40, 49). 
 165. See infra Part III. 
 166. See Erin Schumaker, Here are the states that have shut down nonessential businesses, ABC 
NEWS (Apr. 3, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/states-shut-essential-businesses-
map/story?id=69770806. 
 167. See, e.g., Mike Rogoway, Les Schwab Tire suspends plans to sell company, citing coronavirus, 
OREGONLIVE (updated June 30, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/business/2020/06/les-schwab-tire-
suspends-plans-to-sell-company-citing-coronavirus.html (documenting the suspension of a company sale 
due to potential buyers being unable to value the company’s assets during the pandemic). 
 168. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 41. 
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ultimately took title to the boats and materials, the petitioners had yet to 
be paid, thus resulting in their successful argument that the government’s 
actions were a taking of their property without fair compensation.171 In a 
similar manner, the state lockdowns impacted thousands of nonessential 
business owners who were previously running active commercial 
business operations.172 Like the Armstrong lien-holders, the owners of 
these companies ran normal, day-to-day commercial ventures until their 
state governor instituted a mandatory lock-down, thus diminishing, or in 
some cases wholly abolishing, the value of their enterprises. 
The Supreme Court recognizes two types of takings under the Fifth 
Amendment: (1) actual, physical takings of property by the government, 
and (2) regulatory takings.173 Throughout most of the COVID-19 
closures, states did not levy direct, physical seizures of property from 
residents as a result of the lockdowns.174 Instead, nonessential business 
lockdowns were perhaps more representative of regulatory takings, 
whereby state governments limited the use of private property to such a 
degree that it deprived property owners of any economically reasonable 
use or value of their property.175 With regard to regulatory takings, the 
Supreme court splices them into two categories: (1) categorical or per se 
takings176 and (2) partial takings.177  
A per se taking occurs when a governmental regulation “denies all 
economically beneficial or productive use of land.”178 It serves as the 
functional equivalent of “physical appropriation” of one’s private 
property.179 Applying this standard to the various state level lockdowns 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. See How Many Small Businesses Are There In The US In 2020, OBERLO, 
https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/number-of-small-business-in-the-us (last visited Jan. 12, 2021) 
(documenting that in 2020, there existed more than 31 million small businesses). 
 173. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 174. But see, e.g., N.J. Exec. Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), ttps://nj.gov/infobank 
/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-103.pdf (“… I reserve the right to utilize and employ all available resources of 
the State government of each and every political subdivision of the State, whether or persons, properties, 
or instrumentalities, and to commandeer and utilize any personal services and any privately-owned 
property necessary to protect against this emergency.”). See also Noam N. Levey, Hospitals say feds are 
seizing masks and other coronavirus supplies without a word, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-04-07/hospitals-washington-seize-coronavirus-supplies. 
 175. See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws And Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective On Penn 
Central Transportation Co. V. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 679, 682 (2005) (citing 
to Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) when referencing that a regulatory taking occurs 
when a property regulation goes “too far” in impacting property owners’ rights). 
 176. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 442 (1982) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (referencing to the majority’s per se takings rule as “a permanent physical occupation 
authorized by government… without regard  to the public interests that it may serve). 
 177. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 178. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 179. Id. at 1017. 
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depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Certainly, 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement that property “cannot be rendered valueless by a 
temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover 
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted,” creates an extraordinary legal 
hurdle for nonessential businesses pursuing a per se taking if the state 
ultimately reopened for business.180 On the other hand, businesses that 
never recovered from these closures, and were unable to remain 
commercially viable due to bankruptcy, loss of key employees, financial 
deprivation, event scheduling, or any other economic annihilation, would 
theoretically have per se takings. 
Constitutional arguments for nonessential businesses that reopened 
after state closures lifted would likely fall within the parameter of a partial 
regulatory takings claim. In these situations, businesses’ values did not 
deplete to zero. However, because of state-mandated lockdowns, 
businesses’ commercial values diminished and, in many cases, 
substantially depleted. Analyzing the efficacy of partial takings claims is 
more stringent than that of per se takings, requiring satisfaction of a three-
part test pursuant to Penn Central v. New York City.181 Here, the Supreme 
Court articulated specific factors as relevant to the inquiry: (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation 
interfered with the distinct and reasonable investment backed 
expectations, and (3) the character of the state’s action.182 As noted above, 
applying these standards would result in a case-by-case evaluation of each 
business. The Takings Clause has historically been applied to 
unreasonable price controls that deprive businesses of a reasonable 
profit.183 It is thus not entirely out of the realm of imagination that 
regulations, or in this case, governors’ orders, mandating that nonessential 
businesses close during the pandemic are perchance challengeable under 
Penn Central.184 
The challenges with nonessential businesses seeking just compensation 
via the Takings Clause are, however, multipronged. First, lawsuits would 
have to be filed by nonessential businesses already financially harmed by 
lockdowns. Not all of these ventures will have the financial wherewithal 
or desire to file costly lawsuits after suffering such devastation. Moreover, 
thousands of businesses in every state have been impacted by the 
 
 180. See id. at 1016. 
 181. 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
 182. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
 183. See Tenoco Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Consumer Affairs, 876 F. 2d 1013, 1021-21 (1st Cir. 1989). 
See also Matthew Baughman et. al, Lessons For the COVID-19 Pandemic Landscape, JDSUPRA (Apr. 
29, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/constitutional-limitations-on-emergency-43173/#_edn20. 
 184. Baughman et al., supra note 184. 
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lockdowns. These lawsuits would clog the state and federal court dockets 
unless they were either consolidated or brought forth in some form of 
class action suit.  
Second, nonessential businesses would have to prove injurious 
economic impact due to state-mandated closures. In some cases, this 
could prove exceedingly difficult given that some states have instituted 
second and third "rolling" lockdowns after previously lifting restrictions. 
Third, businesses would have to show the extent to which the closure 
interfered with their distinct and reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. This, again, may be exceptionally challenging depending on 
the extent of closures and restrictions involved. Certain businesses may 
also not have been locked down per se, but the operational restrictions 
were so draconian that such was the functional equivalent of being locked 
down.185  
In addition, injured businesses would have to successfully contend that 
the character of the government action of temporarily closing businesses 
amidst a global pandemic in an effort to protect the public health was not 
of greater interest than individual businesses’ interests in remaining 
operational.186 Perhaps the more reasonable approach with regard to this 
prong would be questioning governors’ justifications as to why some 
businesses were categorized as nonessential, while others were deemed 
essential.187 Finally, there is a reasonable probability that not every state 
will have sufficient resources to provide just compensation to harmed 
businesses in light of increasing budgetary shortfalls.188 A more 
appropriate response would require deployment of compensatory 
damages at the national level, and for purposes of this Article, in the form 
of radical tax reform.189 
In instances where states could possibly afford paying recompense to 
injured businesses that succeed in overcoming the constitutional hurdles 
of the Takings Clause, providing a case-by-case legal analysis for every 
 
 185. Draconian restrictions might include, but are not limited to, extensive limits on numbers of 
customers, and/ or forcing indoor operations to move outdoors.  
 186. See Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (“In 
determining the character of the government action, courts must… balance appellees’ interests against the 
County’s needs to protect the public.”). 
 187. See Stephen L. Carter, Businesses Suing Over COVID-19 Shutdowns May Have a Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-26/business-
owners-suing-over-covid-19-shutdowns-may-have-a-case (raising important questions as to why some 
states allowed golf courses to remain open, while others did not; why Walmart in Pennsylvania was 
allowed to remain operational, but liquor stores in the state were not; and why in Michigan liquor stores 
could remained open, but clothing stores were forced closed). 
 188. See Nicolas Rapp & Brian O’Keefe, State budgets on the brink; 2 maps of America’s looming 
deficits, FORTUNE (Dec. 3, 2020), https://fortune.com/longform/state-budget-deficits-covid-economy-
predictions-outlook/. 
 189. See infra Part III.C. 
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suit filed would be inefficient, expensive, and cumbersome. Perhaps such 
concerns played a role in Congress’ decision to pass the CARES Act, a 
rushed piece of tax legislation touted as critical economic relief for 
businesses and individuals.190 Scholars have since opined, however, that 
the CARES Act cannot be the only Congressional response available to 
alleviate the financial burdens of the pandemic.191 As discussed below, 
Congress’ failure to provide substantial reprieve to nonessential 
businesses by way of the CARES Act warrants further, more tailored 
relief. 
B. The CARES Act That Never Cared 
In response to the nascent COVID-19 recession, on March 27, 2020, 
Mr. Trump signed into law the CARES Act to provide emergency 
supplemental appropriations to individuals, families, businesses, health 
services, educational programs, and state and local governments.192 
Public media referred to the $2.2 trillion dollar emergency aid legislation 
as unprecedented193 and remarkable.194 The CARES Act was third in a 
line of federal coronavirus relief bills signed that month.195 The CARES 
Act was intended to provide economic support across numerous fronts, 
including recovery rebate payments,196 payroll tax relief,197 
unemployment insurance,198 401(k) loan limit increases,199 charitable 
 
 190. See Pamela Foohey et al., CARES Act Gimmicks: How Not To Give People Money During a 
Pandemic and What To Do Instead, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 81 (2020), at 81-2 [hereinafter Foohey et al., 
CARES Act Gimmicks]; Pamela Foohey et al., The Folly of Credit as Pandemic Relief, 68 UCLA L. REV. 
DISC. 126 (2020) (proposing the need for additional economic relief to Americans over and above the 
CARES Act); 
 191. See, e.g., Foohey et al., CARES Act Gimmicks, supra note 191, at 82 (promoting that the 
CARES Act financial support is not enough to prove helpful economic assistance to individuals harmed 
by the pandemic); Wallace, supra note 41 (proposing that the CARES Act unlimited pass-through 
deduction is not a “targeted response” to the COVID-19 circumstances). 
 192. See CARES Act, supra note 31. See also  United States: President Signs CARES Act in 
Response to Coronavirus Pandemic, Library of Congress (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-03-27/united-states-president-signs-cares-act-in-
response-to-coronavirus-pandemic/. 
 193. Melinda Taschetta-Millane, Unprecedented CARES Act Signed into Law, IMAGING TECH. 
NEWS (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.itnonline.com/article/unprecedented-cares-act-signed-law. 
 194. Will the $2.2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package Be Enough?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Mar. 
31, 2020), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/will-the-2-trillion-coronavirus-relief-package-
be-enough/. 
 195. See Pub. L. 116-123, H.R. 6074 (2020), and Pub. L. 116-127, H.R. 6201 (2020). 
 196. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 6428. 
 197. Id. at § 2302. 
 198. Id. at § 3603. 
 199. Id. at § 2202(b). 
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deduction reprieve,200 small business relief,201 corporate loan 
assistance,202 net operating loss (“NOL”) modifications,203 mortgage 
assistance,204 and temporary student-loan repayment suspensions.205 
Markedly broader than the 2018 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), 
which dealt with Code reform, the CARES Act was both interwoven, and 
yet distinct, from its predecessor. Although similar to the TCJA in terms 
of the speed in which it was endorsed,206 the CARES Act retroactively 
corrected various drafting errors made by Congress in its 2018 
legislation207 and relaxed several restrictions imposed by the TCJA on 
businesses.208 The CARES Act also provided numerous nontax aid to 
businesses, including expanding funding opportunities for entrepreneurial 
businesses,209 amending the Bankruptcy Code provisions on small 
business debtor reorganization,210 and offering credit protection to entities 
during the pandemic.211 
What the CARES Act failed to do was address the state level 
governmental actions and Justice Black-like inequities that followed.212 It 
also failed to provide any distinction between essential versus 
nonessential businesses. In fact, these terms are markedly absent from the 
four corners of the CARES Act. This is especially interesting given that 
such distinction was critical when it involved taking profits from 
businesses,213 but when the legislation allowed for money to be given 
back, the distinction was non-existent.  
The only exception to this is buried in the CARES Act’s definition of 
“eligible employer,” which Congress defined as one carrying on a trade 
or business that was fully or partially suspended because of COVID-19 
governmental orders.214 This term, however, is applied solely for 
 
 200. Id. at § 2204. 
 201. Id. at § 1102. 
 202. Id. at § 4003. 
 203. Id. at § 2303. 
 204. Id. at §§ 4022 and 4023. 
 205. Id. at § 3508. 
 206. See Wallace, supra note 41, at 2 (noting that the hastily enacted CARES Act exemplifies “a 
regular mode of tax legislating”). 
 207. See Vincent, supra note 43, at 127 (noting that the CARES Act corrected a drafting error 
included in the TCJA that impacted qualified improvement property bonus depreciation). 
 208. See, e.g., CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2303 (enacting modifications for net operating 
losses), and § 2306 (increasing allowable limitations on business interest expense deductions). 
 209. See id. at § 1103. 
 210. See id. at § 1113. 
 211. See id. at § 4021. 
 212. See supra notes 165-65, 169 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra Part I.C. 
 214. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301(c)(2)(A). See also TCDTRA, supra note 31, at § 303(b) 
(defining the term as, “any employer (A) which conducted an active trade or business in a qualified 
disaster zone at any time during the incident period of the qualified disaster with respect to such qualified 
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purposes of employee retention credit.215 At best, these credits provided 
$5,000 of relief per employee, which was minimally increased by the Tax 
Certainty and Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2020 (“TCDTRA”).216 Such was 
not nearly enough to cover the monumental losses suffered under the 
lockdowns. Other than the aforementioned, every other relief provision 
included in the CARES Act applies to all ventures,217 regardless of 
characterized distinction. 
The CARES Act is comprised of several business tax assistance 
provisions intended to relieve the financial burdens on companies 
impaired by COVID-19. Embedded within Subtitle C of the CARES Act, 
these business provisions provide tax flexibility, and extend temporary 
relief for certain facets of the TCJA. The following chart identifies the 
pertinent sections of the CARES Act that provide some form of tax 
reprieve for all business operations in the United States. 
 
Applicable CARES Act Provisions Brief Description 
Employee Retention Credit For 
Employers Subject to Closure Due to 
COVID-19 
CARES Act § 2301 
 
Updated per the TCDTRA of 2020 § 
303 
Provides eligible employers with a 
refundable payroll tax credit of up to 
$5,000 for qualified wages paid to 
employees from March 13, 2020, to 
December 31, 2020. 
Delay of Payment of Employer 
Payroll Taxes 
CARES Act § 2302 
Allows an employer to defer its 
deposit and payment of the 
employer’s share of Social Security 
and select railroad retirement taxes. 
Modifications for net operating losses 
CARES Act § 2303 
Allows a 5 year carryback for NOLs 
arising in 2018, 2019, and 2020; 
temporarily repeals the 80% of 
taxable income limitation carryback 
rule; and corrects TCJA § 13302(e) by 
changing the original limitation on 
 
disaster zone, and (B) with respect to whom the trade or business described in subparagraph (A) is 
inoperable at any time during the period beginning on the first day of the incident period of such qualified 
disaster and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act, as a result of damage sustained by reason of 
such qualified disaster”). 
 215. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301(c)(2) (allowing a credit to be taken by eligible employers 
against applicable employment taxes in an amount equal to 50% of qualified wages for each employee). 
Id. at § 2301(a). 
 216. Id. at § 2301. See also TCDTRA, supra note 31 (increasing the amount of qualified wages).  
 217. The authors acknowledge that some provisions included in the CARES Act, such as the § 2304, 
specifically apply to taxpayers other than corporations (i.e., individuals and pass-through entities); 
however, there still exists no distinction in this section as to whether the benefit extended is available to 
nonessential businesses, as compared to essential businesses. 
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carrybacks to NOLs arising in tax 
years beginning after December 31, 
2017. 
Modification of limitation on losses 
for taxpayers other than corporations 
CARES Act § 2304 
Temporarily suspends IRC § 461(i), 
thus allowing for unlimited pass-
through deductions of certain business 
tax losses.  
Modification of credit for prior year 
minimum tax liability of corporations 
CARES Act § 2305 
Allows corporations to accelerate the 
use of any of their remaining 
minimum tax credits (MTCs) for their 
2019 tax years from their 2021 tax 
year, and further allows corporations 
to instead elect to recover 100% of 
any remaining MTCs in their 2018 tax 
year. 
Modifications of limitation on 
business interest 
CARES Act § 2306 
Increases the 30% limitation 
established in the TCJA on the 
deduction for business interest 
expense to 50% of adjusted taxable 
income for tax years beginning 2019 
and 2020; and beginning in 2020 
taxpayers can also elect to use their 
2019 adjusted taxable income in 
determining the 50% limitation. 
Technical amendments regarding 
qualified improvement property 
CARES Act § 2307 
Fixes the “retail glitch” created by the 
TCJA by assigning a 15 year recovery 
period, and permitting 100% bonus 
depreciation, for qualified income 
property (QIP). 
 
 As the above chart depicts, seven of the CARES Act provisions were 
specifically designed to assist businesses during the pandemic. As 
previously mentioned, just one provision limits relief specifically to those 
businesses required to suspend operations because of state-mandated 
lockdowns.218 The following subparts analyze these provisions more 
directly. 
1. Section 2301 – Employee Retention Credit 
Section 2301 of the CARES Act, later amended by the TCDTRA, 
provides eligible employers with a refundable tax credit against their 
share of the employment (payroll) tax, equal to a maximum of 50 percent 
 
 218. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301. 
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of qualified wages paid to employees,219 with a maximum credit available 
for each employee of $5,000.220 To be credit-eligible, employers must run 
a business operation that was either fully or partially suspended due to 
governmental orders limiting commerce, travel, or group meetings during 
2020.221 For employers with 100 or less full-time employees, the credit is 
available on wages up to $10,000 per employee;222 for those with more 
than 100 employees, qualified wages are limited to salaries paid to 
employees who were unable to provide services due to the pandemic.223 
This credit is offered in addition to the Families First Coronavirus 
Response Act (FFCRA) payroll tax credits related to paid employee 
leave.224 While the credit provides some relief to nonessential businesses, 
it is not enough to offset the totality of economic damages suffered by 
these entities. In addition, the credit is entirely based on employees and 
their wages and thus wholly inadequate for the over 34 million non-
employer sole proprietors running business operations in the United 
States.225  
The six remaining CARES Act business tax provisions grant relief to 
business ventures, regardless of whether they were shut down. One could 
argue, however, that the entire CARES Act, or a substantial portion of the 
relief provided under it, should have applied only to businesses forcibly 
locked down or which suffered a significant decline in gross receipts due 
to COVID-19 closures. Instead, CARES Act relief was not effectively 
targeted—granting general tax relief to numerous businesses not in need 
of financial assistance.226  
 
 219. This percentage has since been increased to “70 percent of the average quarterly wages paid 
by the employer in calendar year 2019” per the TCDTRA. See TCDTRA, supra note 31, at § 207(b). 
 220. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301 (this provision applies to wages paid after March 12, 
2020 through December 31, 2020). The total wages that are attributed to an employee are capped at 
$10,000, thus resulting in a maximum available credit per employee of $5,000). Id. at (a), (b). Note that 
this amount has since been increased per the TCDTRA. 
 221. Id. at § 2301(c)(2)(A). This provision also applies to businesses that did not shut down, but 
which suffered significant declines in gross receipts during this period, and tax-exempt organizations. Id. 
at § (c)(2)(B), (C). See also TCDTRA, supra note 31, at § 207(c) (amending the CARES Act § 2301(b)(1) 
by striking “for all calendar quarters shall not exceed $10,000”, and inserting, “for any calendar quarter 
shall not exceed $10,000”). 
 222. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
 223. Id. at (c)(3)(A)(i). 
 224. See Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178, §§ 7001-7004 (2020). 
 225. Self-employment income included in Schedule C of Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax 
Return, does not qualify for this credit, nor do wages paid to direct family members. For the credit to 
apply, a sole proprietor must have employees. Per 2018 United States Census data, there are more than 
34 million non-employer businesses in the United States. Because many small businesses are sole 
proprietorships with no employees or non-family member employees, the credit provides no relief to them. 
For additional data regarding the latest non-employer statistics, see 2018 CBP and NES Combined Report, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/econ/nonemployer-statistics/2018-
combined-report.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2021). 
 226. See Terry Gross, How The CARES Act Became A Tax-Break Bonanza For The Rich, Explained, 
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2. Sections 2302 & 2305 – Employer Payroll Tax Payment Delays and 
the AMT 
Section 2302 of the CARES Act allows all employers, including 
governmental entities, to defer the deposit and payment of their share of 
Social Security and certain railroad taxes as required by the Code.227 
Section 2305 allows corporations to claim a refund of their alternative 
minimum tax (“AMT”) credits. In particular, this provision amends Code 
section 53(e), allowing corporations the opportunity to accelerate 
recovery of any outstanding minimum tax credits (“MTC”) in tax years 
beginning in 2019, even though at that time the United States pandemic 
was non-existent.228 This same provision allows corporations the option 
to recover 100 percent of their remaining MTCs beginning in tax year 
2018.229 In effect, Congress remarkably chose to provide relief in tax 
years wholly unrelated to COVID-19. 
3. Section 2307 – Technical Amendments  
Section 2307 of the CARES Act implements a technical correction to 
a TCJA provision.230 Beginning January 1, 2018, Congress intended to 
include Qualified Improvement Property (“QIP”) as 15-year property, 
thus allowing bonus-depreciation eligibility beginning in 2018 via the 
TCJA.231 In doing so, the TCJA eliminated three categories of assets, 
including Qualified Leasehold Improvement Property, Qualified 
Restaurant Property, and Qualified Retail Improvement Property, and 
instead consolidated them all into QIP.232 However, because of a 
Congressional drafting error, QIP was not specifically included in the 
definition of 15-year property in Code section 163(e)(3)(E), nor as 
“qualified property” in Code section 168(k)(2)(A).233 Thus, QIP remained 
as 39-year property and was therefore ineligible for bonus depreciation.234 
To amend this error, the CARES Act implemented a correction which 
 
NPR (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/30/848321204/how-the-cares-act-became-a-tax-
break-bonanza-for-the-rich-explained. 
 227. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2302(a). See also I.R.C. §§ 3111(a); 3221(a). 
 228. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2305(a)(2), (d). See also I.R.C. § 53(e). 
 229. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2305(a)(1), (b). 
 230. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13204, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (hereafter, 
TCJA). 
 231. Cares Act Fixes the Retail Glitch To Make Qualified Improvement Property Eligible For 
Bonus Depreciation, BDO (Mar. 2020), https://www.bdo.com/insights/tax/cost-segregation/cares-act-
fixes-the-retail-glitch-to-make-qualifie. 
 232. See I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(E).  
 233. See Cares Act Fixes the Retail Glitch, supra note 232. 
 234. Id. 
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allows for 100 percent bonus depreciation for QIP.235 These technical 
corrections are intended to fix prior legislation, rather than provide 
financial stimulus. 
4. Sections 2303, 2304, & 2306 – Relaxing the Rules 
Sections 2303, 2304, and 2306 of the CARES Act relax the rules on 
tax loss and deduction claims. Section 2303 expands taxpayers’ abilities 
to deduct NOLs arising prior to January 1, 2021 by temporarily repealing 
the 80% taxable income limitation imposed by the TCJA, thus allowing 
businesses to completely offset their taxable income using the new 5-year 
carryback period provided in the CARES Act.236 As a consequence, 
NOLs incurred during the 2018-2020 tax years can now reduce taxable 
income earned during the five-year period prior to the taxable year in 
which they were incurred, without the taxable income limitation for the 
2018-2020 tax years.237  
While financially valuable, the carry back benefit is moot for small 
businesses that had yet to turn a profit prior to 2020. The CARES Act 
does, however, permit businesses to elect to forego the carryback for tax 
years 2018-2020 to carry forward to future tax years—provided, however, 
any carryforwards to tax year 2021 and beyond will be subject to the 80% 
taxable income limitation (and of course the corporate rate is much lower 
than tax years 2017 and before - i.e., a flat 21% rate). Carrying NOLs 
forward therefore can prove disadvantageous for many companies. 
Considering that only 40 percent of small businesses are ever 
profitable,238 and start-up companies have been hit especially hard during 
the pandemic,239 Section 2303 is more advantageous to businesses 
historically in the black. Using NOLs as a form of "financial relief" is also 
concerning in that determining the exact amount of relief available 
depends on the tax attributes of each specific company.240 In addition, 
 
 235. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2307. 
 236. See id. at § 2303(a), (b). See also I.R.C. § 172(a). 
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Know, FORBES (May 22, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2020/05/22/a-pro-
business-provision-in-the-cares-act-every-business-owner-should-know/#55e714331b3a. 
 238. Small Business Statistics, CHAMBER OF COM., https://www.chamberofcommerce.org/small-
business-statistics/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2020). 
 239. Erin Griffith, Start-Ups Are Pummeled in the ‘Great Unwinding’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/technology/virus-start-ups-pummeled-layoffs-unwinding.html. 
 240. Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Monetizing NOLs During a Recession,  98 TAX NOTES 
INT’L 994, 998, June 1, 2020 ("The use of NOLs during the prior two recessions holds two lessons. First, 
it is inherently difficult for current NOLs to provide immediate cash flow to businesses and rapid stimulus 
to the economy. Based on a review of procedures and the data, a lag of a year between occurrence of the 
loss and receipt of a refund seems common. Second, complexity and diminution of tax benefits 
(attributable to the interaction of carrybacks with other tax provisions) significantly reduces the use of 
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these rules were loosened for tax years wholly unrelated to the pandemic, 
which is peculiar (i.e., 2018 and 2019). The precise amount of relief 
available is further complicated as companies require prior year 
profitability before they can take advantage of NOL carrybacks, and 
NOLs are not dollar-for-dollar.241 Thus, such relaxed NOL rules are of 
great benefit for some companies but of little to no benefit for others. 
Finally, as stated above, the CARES Act does not distinguish between 
essential and nonessential businesses, thereby prompting an important 
question as to why essential businesses profiting from the lockdowns are 
permitted to utilize relaxed NOL rules against prior profitable years that 
have no association to the pandemic or mandated lockdowns. Such an 
arbitrary provision begets a blanket tax giveaway, regardless of whether 
businesses were harmed by pandemic closures. 
Section 2304 of the CARES Act amends Code section 461(l), which 
imposes limits on excess business losses of noncorporate taxpayers.242 
Before the TCJA’s passage, individuals, estates and taxable trusts that 
realized business losses directly (or through pass-through entities) could 
generally offset those losses against non-business income, and carry any 
resulting NOLs back two years.243 In 2017, the TCJA restricted the ability 
to deduct these losses against non-business income to no more than 
$250,000 (or $500,000 for joint filers).244 In addition, Code section 461(l) 
removed the availability of NOL carrybacks.245 Section 2304 of the 
CARES Act provides some relief to these limitations.246 In particular, 
individuals, estates, and taxable trusts can now temporarily use business 
losses to offset non-business income above the previously established 
limits for tax years 2018-2020, with any remaining losses treated as 
NOLs.247 These relaxed rules are available for all individuals, estates and 
taxable trusts; however, they are contingent on each taxpayer's particular 
 
NOL carrybacks below what might be expected based on the conventional wisdom that carrybacks are 
more valuable than carryforwards."). 
 241. For example, a NOL carried back to tax years 2017 (and prior) are subject to graduated 
corporate rates ranging from 15% to 35% with two surcharge tax brackets of 39% and 38%, respectively. 
Therefore, the exact amount of the "dollar-for-dollar " refund to the taxpayer depends on what the entity's 
"taxable income" was for that tax year involved (e.g., if it was 15%, it is 15% times the carryback). For 
tax years, 2018 and forward, however, the corporate rate is a flat 21%, so any carryback deduction will 
be exposed to a 21% rate with a resulting dollar-for-dollar refund. 
 242. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2304. See also I.R.C. § 461(l) (2017). 
 243. Gary C. Karch & Alex Ruff, Individual Loss Carryback Refunds Under the Cares Act, 
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.mwe.com/insights/individual-loss-
carryback-refunds-under-the-cares-act-covid19/. 
 244. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2304. See also I.R.C. § 461(l) (2017) (preventing non-
corporate taxpayers from deducting business losses in excess of $250,000 ($500,000 for joint returns)). 
 245. I.R.C. § 461(l)(2). 
 246. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2304(a). See also Karch & Ruff, supra note 244. 
 247. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2304(c). See also Karch & Ruff, supra note 244. 
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tax circumstances. Section 2304 is largely impractical for many small 
businesses.248 Suspending this provision only allows those taxpayers with 
exorbitant incomes to deduct the full amount of their tax losses against 
available non-business income, thus reducing or eliminating their income 
tax liability currently and retroactively.249 In comparison, small 
businesses that have little-to-no ability to offset losses in this manner will 
continue to struggle. Funding large tax cuts for the wealthy, instead of 
creating pandemic relief tax policy aimed at supporting those most 
negatively impacted by the lockdowns, is largely inappropriate.250 
Completing the trifecta of CARES Act provisions aimed at tax loss and 
deduction relief, section 2306 relaxes the limitations imposed by the 
TCJA on the deductibility of business interest expenses.251 Code section 
164(j) previously enforced a limitation on the deduction for business 
interest expenses based on the sum of the taxpayer’s business interest, 
including 30 percent of their adjusted taxable income and floor plan 
financing interest for the taxable year.252 These limits were imposed on 
businesses with average annual gross receipts of $25,000,000 or more 
over the prior three year period.253 Many small businesses designated as 
nonessential were never limited by this provision because of the gross 
receipts threshold. Nevertheless, section 2306 lessened these limitations 
by increasing the adjusted taxable income percentage to 50 percent for tax 
years 2019 and 2020.254 In addition, beginning in 2020 taxpayers can elect 
to use their 2019 adjusted taxable income to determine the 50 percent 
limitation.255 This provision benefits taxpayers whose income fell in 
2020, as compared to 2019.256 Overall, however, the usefulness of this 
provision to small businesses is questionable due to the gross receipts 
threshold. 
Congress’ failure to distinguish between essential and nonessential 
businesses in the CARES Act is a fatal flaw in addressing lockdown 
inequities. In many respects, the CARES Act was a knee-jerk reaction to 
a crisis, indiscriminately sprinkling tax benefits upon businesses with 
little thought given to tailoring the specific relief to those needing it 
 
 248. CARES Act, supra note 31. See also Karch & Ruff, supra note 244. 
 249. Wallace, supra note 41. 
 250. See Jeff Cox, A Record 20.5 million jobs were lost in April as unemployment rate jumps to 
14.7%, CNBC (May 8, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/08/jobs-report-april-2020.html. 
 251. See CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2306. See also I.R.C. § 163(j)(2017). 
 252. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(1). 
 253. See I.R.C. §§ 163(j)(3); 448(c)(1). 
 254. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2306 (a)(10)(A)(i). 
 255. Id. at (a)(10)(B). 
 256. Gene Schlack et al., Summary of Certain Tax Relief Available In COVID-19 CARES Act, DAY 
PITNEY (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.daypitney.com/insights/publications/2020/03/30-certain-tax-relief-
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most—the nonessentials. The essential businesses that remained 
operational and profitable do not require additional tax relief. With the 
exception of the payroll retention credit, Congress’ decision to grant tax 
relief to all businesses merely accelerated the unfair advantage essential 
companies already had over the nonessentials. It serves as the proverbial 
salt in the wound of governmental injustice. 
Another concern is that the relief provided under the CARES Act was 
not substantial enough to offset the magnitude of economic devastation 
caused by the lockdowns.257 While in totality the CARES Act provided 
over $2 trillion in funds, many small businesses may never recover.258 For 
those that survived, McKinsey estimates it may take decades to 
financially recuperate,259 requiring long-term, hand-holding solutions 
akin to the below-proposed tax-exemptions.260 The unique issues faced 
by small businesses, including slim margins, low financial resilience, 
heavy debt, and minimal cash liquidity to fund the additional costs 
required for Center for Disease Control (CDC) compliance, makes rapid 
recovery extremely difficult.261 
There has not been a level playing field in the marketplace since March 
2020. Nonessential businesses were benched, while essential businesses 
hit home runs—posting record sales and profits.262 The CARES Act 
enhanced this inequity. Cleaning services, grocers, fitness equipment 
companies, mask makers, and telehealth companies thrived because of 
increased consumer demands.263 From January to August 2020, e-
commerce sales exceeded $2 billion on 130 separate days, as compared 
to 2019 when only two days hit such a mark.264 While online sales 
skyrocketed, brick-and-mortar establishments crumbled.265 Fifty five 
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percent of businesses listed on Yelp closed permanently due to lockdown 
disruptions and restrictions.266 Eight hundred small businesses filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy between mid-February and July 31, 2020.267 
Hospitality operations, sports and performing art centers, restaurants, 
bars, and clothing stores were among the hardest hit.268 While the CARES 
Act provided unemployment aid and small business payroll support 
systems, it also gave financial assistance to companies profiting during 
the lockdowns.269  
Economic aid under the CARES Act is disproportionally granted to 
large companies.270 The economic relief should have been directed at 
nonessential businesses forcibly shut down. If Congress really "cared" 
about small businesses, it would have offered deliberate and targeted 
support, carefully distinguishing between essential and nonessential 
businesses. Responding to concerns that essential businesses and select 
industries have financially capitalized on the lockdowns, some have 
proposed that an excess profits tax should be imposed to curb corporate 
profiteering, as next discussed.271  
C. You Can't Have An Excess Profits Tax Without a War 
On January 31, 2020, United States Secretary of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”), Alex M. Azar II, pronounced a public health 
emergency.272 Within two months, Mr. Trump declared a “national 
emergency.”273 Rather than frame the emergency as a public health crisis, 
however, Mr. Trump and others, both domestically and abroad, employed 
wartime rhetoric to reference COVID-19.274 Such metaphorical use of the 
term “war” during the global pandemic is perhaps not surprising, given 
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hardest hit, BUS. INSIDER (May 12, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/jobs-industries-careers-hit-
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the United States’ obsession with war.275 Still, categorizing a national 
public health emergency as “war” is not a formidable approach to 
salvaging nonessential businesses harmed by lockdowns and restrictions.  
Even before declaring a national emergency, in March 2020, Mr. 
Trump labeled himself as a “war-time president” battling an invisible 
enemy.276 That same month, French President Emmanuel Macron told his 
people, “We are at War.”277 In April 2020, Queen Elizabeth informed her 
constituents, “we will meet again,” summoning the spirit of World War I 
while assuring her country that “Together we are tackling this disease.”278 
Politicians in the United States made similar wartime references amidst 
the pandemic. New York Governor Andrew Cuomo referred to health 
care workers as “soldiers in this fight.”279 Alabama Governor Kay Ivey 
informed her state, “[w]e are at war with an invisible enemy.”280 Even 
Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan publicly acknowledged, “[w]e’re 
in a war to contain this virus.”281 
Such rhetoric manifests a sustained history of leaders declaring “war” 
against an enemy, no matter how realistically palpable the opponent is.282 
In 1971, President Richard Nixon declared a “war on cancer.”283 President 
George W. Bush was the first to use the term “war on terrorism” in 
reference to a battle with no identifiable enemy nation-state.284 President 
Lyndon B. Johnson used wartime rhetoric in reference to the “war on 
poverty.”285 President Ronald Reagan’s infamous “war on drugs” 
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campaign286 resulted in some questioning whether it was, instead, a “war 
on Blacks.”287 In fact, such combative expression is so commonplace in 
American culture that it has been exploited across numerous political 
escapades, including the “war on reason,”288 “war on cops,”289 “war on 
culture,”290 and “war on truth.”291 
Some have questioned the social costs of using warfare metaphors as a 
substitute for circumstantial reality.292 The use of such rhetoric has led 
certain Americans to feel marginalized, diversified, and fatigued,293 while 
others enjoy the abstract glorification that their nation is engaged in battle, 
without actually experiencing the “horrors and sacrifices” of war.294 War, 
by definition, equates to “a state of usually open and declared armed 
hostile conflict between states or nations.”295 The Ninth Circuit defines 
the term as “the employment of force between governments or entities 
essentially like governments.”296 The Superior Court of New Jersey 
surmises that “war” should be given its ordinary meaning of “actual 
hostilities between the armed forces of two or more nations or states.”297  
The COVID-19 pandemic is not a war any more than the fight against 
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2, 137-142 (2004) (expounding that America is engaged in a war that destroys Iraqian culture). 
 291. Id. at 139-40 (questioning political truths made to the common people). 
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cancer or heart disease.298 Unlike actual wars that often come to an end,299 
the "war" against COVID-19 may never fully conclude, as similarly 
realized in health battles against pneumonia, the common cold, human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), or herpes.300 Disease is certainly an 
enemy of the people, making it easy for humanity to embrace a wartime 
metaphor to feel secure against its rage.301 However, those who suggest 
that an excess profits tax be imposed on large companies benefitting from 
COVID-19 are misappropriating such rhetoric. Imposing an excess 
profits tax to combat the pandemic’s economic damage would contradict 
historical tax policy, as federal tax policy supports the use of an excess 
profits tax only “in time[s] of war.”302  
The United States first experimented with an excess profits tax during 
the Civil War.303 In 1893, the state of Georgia adopted a graduated excess 
profits tax based on a ratio of invested capital to profits.304 The tax was a 
consequence of a generalized public concern over certain war-profiting, 
particularly with regard to those manufacturing uniforms and other war-
related materials.305  
A munitions tax was instituted on profits in the Revenue Act of 1916.306 
In addition to the typical income tax, the munitions tax was a flat excise 
tax of 12.5 percent imposed on the net profits from the sale or disposition 
of munitions.307 “Munitions” included ammunition, and other articles of 
war like gunpowder, firearms, cannons, electric motor boats, and 
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submarines.308 Claude Kitchin, United States House of Representatives 
majority leader, and chairman for the House Ways and Means Committee, 
defended the tax, noting that companies like DuPont held a monopoly on 
the sale of gun powder to the government.309  
In 1917, the excess profits tax entered the taxing landscape to finance 
World War I.310 In particular, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, New 
Zealand, South Africa, France, Italy, and the United States introduced 
excess profits taxes in light of the massive governmental expenditures 
needed for combat.311 In the United States, the eight percent tax was 
levied on corporations and partnerships with net income exceeding 
$5,000 and eight percent of actual capital invested.312 It was met with 
significant controversy and protest,313 resulting in few paying any tax 
under the original bill.314 Instead, the Revenue Act of 1917 was largely 
superseded by the War Revenue Act, which Congress implemented to 
help defray war costs.315 The new revenue act included graduated rates 
ranging from 20 to 60 percent.316 The War Revenue Act was in effect only 
briefly, subsequently replaced one year later.317 The 1918 excess profits 
tax was only levied on corporations, at a rate of 80 percent.318 While the 
rate varied in tax years 1919, 1920 and 1921, it increased to an astounding 
95 percent during World War II.319 The tax has since remained dormant. 
Recently, as many essential businesses’ profits increased dramatically 
amidst state  lockdowns, commentators proposed the re-deployment of an 
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excess profits tax to remedy perceived inequitable profiteering.320 
Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah was one of the first tax scholars to do so, 
suggesting that such taxes be employed at a rate of 95 percent on 
companies benefitting from the pandemic.321 He recommended using a 
modified version of the average earnings method to calculate the excess 
profits tax, using book income instead of taxable income.322  He suggested 
the 95 percent tax rate should apply against the excess amount of income 
over a certain calculated base amount.323  
Many economists have similarly recommended implementing an 
excess profits tax to target COVID-profiting companies,324 as have certain 
tax policy institutes.325 Congressional member Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii) 
introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives for an excess 
profits tax on corporations benefiting from the pandemic and use the 
revenue to assist small businesses.326 Her proposal suggests a 95 percent 
tax rate (similar to Avi-Yonah's proposal), using average "gross receipts" 
from 2016-2019 as the base from which to subtract 2020 gross 
earnings.327 Scholars Tarcisio Magalhaes and Allison Christians suggest 
 
 320. See e.g., Nick Shaxson, Tax Justice and the Coronavirus, TAX JUST. NETWORK (Mar. 24, 
2020), https://www.taxjustice.net/2020/03/24/tax-justice-and-the-coronavirus/, and Alex Hemingway, 
Excess Profits Tax Needed to Prevent Profiteering Amid COVID-19, TORONTO STAR (April 23, 2020), 
https://www.thestar.com/opinion/contributors/2020/04/23/excess-profits-tax-needed-to-prevent-
profiteering-amid-covid-19.html. 
 321. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Taxes in the Time of Coronavirus: Is it Time to Revive the Excess 
Profits Tax?, U. OF MICH. PUB. L. RES. PAPER NO. 671, (May 19, 2020). 
 322. Id. (In addition, using net (taxable) income as the base is problematic because many highly 
profitable corporations can reduce or eliminate their tax liability by using deductions for tax purposes but 
not for book purposes. For example, Amazon paid little tax in 2019 because it (a) expenses physical 
equipment like servers and warehouses under the TCJA, (d) expenses R&D, and (c) deducts the excess 
value of its stock over the exercise price of stock options…Therefore, the tax base should be book income, 
not taxable income."). See also Michelle L. Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters And Narrowing The Book/ 
Tax “GAAP”, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 539, 541 (2001). 
 323. Id. 
 324. See e.g., Johnathan Nicholson, Tax "Excess: Profits of Big Money-Making Companies to Fix 
Coronavirus Economy, Scholar Urges, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/tax-excess-profits-of-big-money-making-companies-to-fix-
coronavirus-economy-scholar-urges-2020-04-30 (quoting economist Gabriel Zucman in his 
recommendation that an excess profits tax be implemented to remove incentives for profiteering by 
companies); Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, Jobs Aren’t Being Destroyed This Fast Elsewhere. 
Why is That?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/opinion/coronavirus-
economy-saez-zucman.html ("The government should impose excess profits taxes, as it has done several 
times in the past during periods of crisis."). 
 325. Agustin, et al., supra note 29, at 25 (proposing an excess profits tax); Collins, et al., supra note 
29, at 16 (recommending the enactment of an excess profits tax); Melani Cammett & Evan Lieberman, 
Building Solidarity: Challenges, Options, and Implications for COVID-19 Responses, EDMOND J. SAFRA 
CTR. FOR ETHICS, at 5 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-
ethics/files/safrawhitepaper4c.pdf (suggesting the United States consider adopting an excess profits tax).  
 326. H.R. Res. 1267, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 327. Id. ("That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that Congress should reinstate a 
pandemic excess profits tax on large corporations who have made excess profits due to the pandemic and 
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that imposing a national-level excess profits tax would be ineffective, as 
the mobility of numerous business’ capital  and profits would enhance 
existing base erosion and profit shifting concerns.328 Instead, they 
recommend a "global excess profits tax," where country-by-county 
reporting exists, thus making such tax imposition more efficient and 
effective.329  
Other commentators, like Joseph J. Thorndike, suggest that an excess 
profits tax misaligns the current issues, arguing that a "health care crisis" 
is distinctly different from a wartime crisis and the respective "sacrifices" 
involved.330 Some decry proponents of an excess profits tax as using the 
pandemic as an opportunity to further pre-crisis preferences for higher 
taxation on profitable multinationals.331 In addition, some scholars find 
that historic excess profits taxes were difficult to administer, created 
compliance complexities, undermined innovation, and impacted 
economic growth.332 Certainly, others have proposed additional tax 
solutions to the COVID-19 crisis, including expanding sales taxes, 
imposing mark-to-market taxation on certain types of wealth, and 
implementing digital advertising taxes.333 
At first glance, proposals to increase taxation on companies that 
"profited" from the pandemic are superficially alluring. While 
nonessential businesses lost profits due to closures, essential businesses 
were permitted to thrive. However, the current COVID-19 crisis is by no 
means a "wartime" scenario; nor does it involve the same physical 
sacrifices as required on foreign battlefields during actual wartime. 
Instead, as discussed, the "wartime" metaphor that Mr. Trump and others 
have used in reference to the pandemic is mere rhetoric.334 Mandated 
lockdowns, and corresponding damages, were a direct result of numerous 
(albeit, not all) state governors’ actions, rather than an enemy 
 
related government restrictions by using average gross earnings from 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019 and 
subtract the average from total 2020 gross earnings, and apply a 95-percent tax rate to the excess profits 
which shall be directed to fund economic relief to small businesses."). It is unclear whether this resolution 
would apply to book income or tax income. 
 328. Christians & Magalhães, supra note 29, at 508; Tarcisio Diniz Magalhães & Allison 
Christians, Rethinking Tax for the Digital Economy After Covid-19, 11 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (2021). 
 329. Magalhães & Christians, supra note 329. 
 330. Joseph J. Thorndike, Should We Tax Excess Profits or Pandemic Profits? 167 TAX NOTES 
FED. 399, 404, Apr. 20, 2020, ("As I have argued recently, I'm not entirely convinced that the moral 
arguments buttressing wartime excess profits taxes will translate so easily into the current pandemic 
emergency; limiting the profits of arms manufacturers carries a different moral and political valence than 
limiting profits of vaccine producers."). 
 331. George K. Yin, Is it Really Time for an Excess Profits Tax? 167 TAX NOTES FED. 833, 834, 
May 4, 2020. 
 332. See Hodge, supra note 317. 
 333. See e.g., Lauren Loricchio, Academics Offer Solutions to Address COVID-19 Fiscal Crisis, 
170 TAX NOTES FED. 1166, Feb. 15, 2021. 
 334. See supra Part II.C. 
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combatant.335 Essential businesses played no part in this decision-making 
process, which effectively evolved from federal CISA guidance.336 
Imposing an excess profits tax on pandemic-profiting businesses is a 
slippery slope because of the vagueness in identifying with any certainty 
what “profiting” means under the circumstances. For example, should 
profits attributable to the overriding health crisis, including vaccine or 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) sales, be included?337 Should select 
business ventures, allowed to remain operational in some states, but 
forcibly closed in others, be targeted for profiting? Does merely being in 
a state of a pandemic warrant the imposition of an excess profits tax on 
abnormally high profits; and if so, how would excessive profits be 
determined?338  
During war times, increased military spending helped expand 
economic activity and the gross domestic product (GDP).339 Historically, 
the United States government spent significant funds on military contracts 
for war-like amenities, including ammunition and aircraft.340 
Governmental contracts guaranteed a market for wartime production.341 
The United States government constructed and owned contractor-run 
factories that manufactured wartime products,342 and purchase 
agreements between the government and the private sector helped 
eliminate private production risks.343 Throughout, lives were lost on 
foreign battlegrounds, thus legitimizing a tax on the "excess" profits of 
the "merchants of death" that profited from manufacturing weapons, 
ammunitions, and aircraft. 
COVID-profiting businesses do not resemble war-profiting merchants. 
For example, Home Depot’s increased lumber sales due to persons 
 
 335. See supra Part I.C. 
 336. Id.  
 337. See Thorndike, supra note 29, at 2026 (suggesting that health care in general conceptually 
profits from the personal suffering of others, yet it also produces a good for society and those suffering). 
 338. In keeping with this query, the authors question how “abnormally high” would be determined? 
Would a theoretical standard be required to help establish what earnings should otherwise “look like”, 
perhaps based on prior earnings or capital? 
 339. Economic Consequences of War on the U.S. Economy, INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, 
https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Consequences-of-
War-on-US-Economy_0.pdf (last accessed Sept. 25, 2021) ("Using data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, figure one shows the composition of U.S. GDP in consumption, investment, government 
spending and net exports and imports in per-capita terms. It can be seen the war years of 1941 to 1945 
saw one of the most significant short term increases in economic growth in the history of the U.S. 
economy."). 
 340. Price Fishback, World War II in America: Spending, Deficits, Multipliers, and Sacrifice, VOX 
EU (Nov. 12, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/world-war-ii-america-spending-deficits-multipliers-and-
sacrifice. 
 341. See Thorndike, supra note 29, at 2024. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Id. 
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tackling home improvement projects while under state-mandated 
quarantines should not result in added tax penalization344 any more than 
increased lumber sales should following hurricanes.345 Likewise, the 
surplus in persons’ streaming movies while under quarantine should not 
result in Amazon Prime being penalized with additional taxes,346 any 
more than when viewers set TV viewing records during blizzards.347 
Increased lumber sales and video streaming as a result of unanticipated 
state actions should not be equated to circumstances where businesses 
manufacture ammunition under guaranteed government contracts with no 
market risk while soldiers are on the front lines dying.348  
An additional concern in imposing an excess profits tax is defining the 
exact nature of "excess" profit. It is not uncommon for a successful 
company, like Amazon, to continually outperform analysts’ expectations 
in predicting its quarterly earnings.349 If expert analysts are unable to 
accurately predict Amazon’s earnings, then there is little confidence that 
the United States government can adequately predict what a base amount 
of Amazon’s "normal" earnings should look like, and what constitutes 
"excess" earnings.350 An excess profits tax would surely stifle growth, 
innovation and efficiencies in companies exceeding earnings 
expectations.351 Even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon was 
surpassing earning prospects.352  
As discussed, two methods have historically been used to assess a 
company's excess profits: (1) the invested capital method353 and (2) the 
 
 344. See Sarah Kelleher, Consumers Turning to Home Improvement Projects During Lockdown, 
COMSCORE (May 7, 2020), https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Blog/Consumers-Turning-to-Home-
Improvement-Projects-During-Lockdown. 
 345. See Michael Flood, Why Strong Demand and Tight Supply Have Caused Lumber Prices to 
Soar, NEBS, https://nebldgsupply.com/strong-demand-and-tight-supply-have-caused-lumber-prices-to-
soar/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2020). 
 346. See Kiko Martinez, Viral Load: There’s A Surplus of ‘Virus Movies’ to Stream on Amazon 
Prime During Quarantine, SAN ANOTONIO CURRENT (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.sacurrent.com/sanantonio/viral-load-theres-a-surplus-of-virus-movies-to-stream-on-
amazon-prime-during-quarantine/Slideshow/23604000. 
 347. See Hope King, Blizzard helps set record for on-demand TV viewing, CNN BUS. (Jan. 25, 
2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/01/25/media/blizzard-tv-comcast/index.html. 
 348. Dwight Jon Zimmerman, Bullets by the Billions: Chrysler Switches World War II Production 
From Cars to Cartridges, DEF. MEDIA NETWORK (June 14, 2012), https://www.defensemedianetwork 
.com/stories/bullets-by-the-billions-chrysler-switches-world-war-ii-production-from-cars-to-cartridges/. 
 349. Amazon, Inc. (AMZN), Earnings Estimates, BARCHART (Feb. 12, 2021), 
https://www.barchart.com/stocks/quotes/AMZN/earnings-estimates. 
 350. Amazon, Inc. (AMZN), CNBC (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/AMZN? 
tab=earnings (Amazon beat earnings estimates in the first and fourth quarters of 2019 and in every quarter 
of 2018). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. See supra note 305 and accompanying text. 
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average earnings method.354 As scholar Avi-Yonah suggests, the invested 
capital method may be problematic for high-tech companies that are not 
capital intensive.355 Instead, he suggests the average earnings method be 
used.356 In deploying this method, he recommends using book income 
instead of taxable income because of companies like Amazon having low 
tax exposure.357  
While book income can be significantly higher than taxable income, it 
is based on an entirely different set of principles, namely GAAP.358 In 
contrast, taxable income is determined under the Code.359 As scholar 
Mitchell Engler notes, these two sets of rules create a “mismatch of tax 
and book reporting[.]”360 The Code provides various opportunities for 
taxpayers to reduce their taxable income to the extent possible; in 
contrast, corporate managers are encouraged to increase their book 
income to the extent possible as shareholders, investors, and creditors 
prefer companies with high earnings. For tax purposes, losses and 
deductions are generally favored; in contrast, losses and deductions 
decrease book income and are thus generally disfavored. From a tax 
policy perspective, it would be inappropriate to assess a tax on excess 
profits defined under a set of rules outside the purview of the Code. Such 
concern would likewise exist if a global excess profits tax was imposed 
using GAAP principals. 
The above recommendations suggest a repackaged version of a long-
standing concern that many tax scholars harbor with respect to 
multinational companies earning significant income without paying their 
fair share.361 However, recommending an excess profits tax as a backdoor 
means of addressing this issue is not appropriate. Such endorsement 
misses the underlying point of the excess profits tax, and its historical 
purpose. It also runs contrary to the current direction of the Code and the 
many tax incentives and avoidance opportunities it provides. 
Numerous companies deemed “essential” were profiting long before 
the onset of the pandemic,362 taking advantage of the evolving 
 
 354. See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
 355. See Avi-Yonah, supra, note 322. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Id. 
 358. Engler, supra note 323, at 541. 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. See Yin supra, note 332. 
 362. Amazon EPS - Earnings Per Share 2006 - 2020: AMZN, MACROTRENDS, (last visited Sept. 
26, 2021), https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AMZN/amazon/eps-earnings-per-share-diluted 
(Amazon's annual EPS increased 227.48% in 2018 from 2017, 14.25% in 2019 from 2018, and 81.79% 
in 2020 from 2019).  
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marketplace shift from brick-and-mortar to online.363 State lockdowns 
only accelerated the technological shift in the marketplace.364 Still, while 
Amazon and others did indeed profit, they spent substantial amounts on 
CDC safety measures to remain operational.365  
As this Article purports, it is the United States government’s 
responsibility—not profiting enterprises—to make small businesses 
"whole" again. If essential companies, like Amazon, are identified as not 
paying enough taxes in light of their profits, it is the Code that must be 
amended to “fix” the issue, regardless of the pandemic.366 The excess 
profits tax is more appropriately designed for times of war; not by 
nomenclature but reality. The economic damage suffered by small 
businesses was a direct result of state-mandated lockdowns. Not every 
small business was financially decimated during the pandemic367 and, 
likewise, not all operational businesses enjoyed increased profits. Those 
that did filled a void in the free-market. Satisfying this need involved 
market-place and financial risk, rather than governmental assistance, co-
ownership, or guarantees. Manufacturers during the pandemic did not 
profit from making weapons of war, but instead from toilet paper 
production.368 Tax law encourages profit making. Any proposals wanting 
to define what a "normal" profit base should look like in order to tax the 
excess runs contrary to existing tax law. Instead of taxing excess profits, 
this Article suggests that qualifying businesses that were forcibly locked 
down during the pandemic be granted temporary federal tax-exempt 
status during their economic recovery period and donations made to them 
be tax deductible. 
III. RADICALIZING NON-PROFIT LAW FOR “COVID COMPANIES” 
Historically, there exists a bright-line division between for-profit and 
 
 363. See Kathryn Kisska-Schulze et al., Case Baiting, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 321, 327 (2020) (noting the 
transition from a brick-and-mortar market to that of e-commerce). 
 364. See Emmy Hawker, Has Coronavirus Brought Brick-And-Mortar Retail To An End?, BUS. 
BECAUSE (July 27, 2020), https://www.businessbecause.com/news/insights/7119/the-end-of-brick-and-
mortar-retail 
 365. Lauren Debter, Amazon Says it Will Forgo Billions in Profits to Invest Into Worker Safety 
Measures, Forbes (April 30, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurendebter/2020/04/30/amazon-first-
quarter-earnings/?sh=721154d6459e 
 366. It is important to consider that the alternative minimum tax (AMT) was eliminated for 
corporations under the TCJA. Thus, from a Congressional standpoint, there is no theoretical "minimum" 
amount of federal tax that companies should be paying. See TCJA, supra note 231, at § 12001. 
 367. See Nina Roberts, Some small businesses are flourishing during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
MARKETPLACE (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/03/25/some-small-businesses-are-
flourishing-during-the-covid-19-pandemic/. 
 368. See Jen Wieczner, The case of the missing toilet paper: How the coronavirus exposed U.S. 
supply chain flaws, FORTUNE (May 18, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/05/18/toilet-paper-sales-surge-
shortage-coronavirus-pandemic-supply-chain-cpg-panic-buying/. 
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not for-profit organizations in the Code and judicial system.369 While 
continued support for this lucid distinction remains,370 some advocate that 
such rigid partition be relaxed to accommodate the increasing number of 
companies engaging in corporate social responsibility, for-profit 
philanthropy, and social enterprise.371 In their seminal essay, The Case 
For For-Profit Charities, scholars Anup Malani and Eric Posner promote 
that tax benefits, akin to those granted to non-profit organizations, be 
extended to for-profit firms providing large-scale community benefits.372 
Responding to Malani and Posner’s proposition, scholar Brian Galle 
criticized the legal transmutation of for-profit companies into charitable 
organizations, arguing that such metamorphosis would diminish, among 
other things, the nondistribution constraint and "warm glow" effects 
attributable to charitable organizations.373 Notwithstanding, philanthropic 
companies like Google.org have pursued the for-profit charitable model, 
even without the benefits of favorable tax-exempt status.374 
Based on the staggering number of nonessential, for-profit businesses 
harmed or permanently shuttered as a consequence of state-mandated 
COVID-19 lockdowns, this Article advances that easing the legal barrier 
between for- and not for-profit organizations has reached a critical apex. 
 
 369. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)-(4); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-1 and 1.501(c)(4)-1. See also, e.g., 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114, 1186 n. 10 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that while the 
government differentiates for-and not for-profit organizations, numerous corporate forms fail to mirror 
the bright line distinction), and Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., 112 S.W. 3d 486, 500 
(Tenn. App. 2002) (professing that the distinction between for- and not for-profit entities lies in the 
premise that for-profit entities allow for private enrichment, while “nonprofit organizations are subject to 
the non-distribution constraint.”). 
 370. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1233 (2010) ("… 
extending the charitable-contribution deduction to include contributions to for-profit firms creates risks 
that are not worth the putative benefits. For-profit charity threatens to shift costs to charities, weaken the 
warm glow of giving, distort managerial incentives, and diminish or confuse donor choice."); Benjamin 
Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 819 (2012) (arguing that it is 
proper for the government to withhold the deductibility of charitable contributions of for-profit 
enterprises); and Victor Fleischer, Response: "For Profit Charity": Not Quite Ready for Prime Time, 93 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 231 (2008) (positing that extending non-profit status to philanthropic for-profit 
entities is unworkable as a tax concept). 
 371. See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 
2017 (2007) (proposing that federal tax law change to provide tax benefits to for-profit entities operating 
for “charitable” purposes), and  Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit. Nonprofit 
Border, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 489 (2014) (suggesting that federal tax law change to encourage more 
cross-sector collaborations between for- and not for-profit entities to allow for greater social good via 
corporate social responsibility, for-profit philanthropy, and social enterprise). 
 372. Malani & Posner, supra note 372, at 2062-64. 
 373. See Galle, supra note 371, at 1217, 1224-25 ("Mixing charitable enterprise with the for-profit 
form would undermine the benefits of warm glow for everyone….Malani and Posner's proposal would 
create this confusion by making it unclear whether any given firm producing charitable services was 
paying its employees a share of profits.").  
 374. See Christopher Lim, Google.org, For-Profit Charitable Entity: Another Smart Decision By 
Google, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28, 29 (2007).  
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The pandemic’s impact, and ensuing state closures, accelerated a 
monumental secular change in the United States economy from standard 
brick and mortar to a landscape dominated by multinational technology 
companies.375 This Article suggests that a genuine public interest exists 
in protecting and fostering nonessential businesses’ perpetuities. Such 
public interest is not solely relegated to the equity in making these 
businesses "whole" again but embodies a societal interest in preserving 
the stout economic and innovative forces that these ventures provide.376 
To help resurrect those businesses negatively impacted by COVID-19 
closures, this Article posits a revolutionary federal tax solution, which 
applies the ideals of pre-existing federal tax policy to a new problem. 
Such elucidation is perhaps similar to NASA scientist Katherine Goble 
Johnson’s use of “old math” to calculate the trajectory of John Glenn’s 
space capsule, as illustrated in the movie Hidden Figures.377 Her answer 
to the problem: Euler’s Method; to which one engineer jeers, “That’s 
ancient”, prompting her firm resolve, “Yes. But it works.”378 
Current tax policy, while robust, is insufficient to meet the economic 
needs of nonessential businesses as traditionally applied. The United 
States is facing abnormal times and somber economic setbacks. There is 
nothing “normal” about restricting taxpayers’ abilities to run legal 
business operations due to severe government ascendancy; nor is it 
“ordinary” to confine consumers to their residences for lengthy periods of 
time. When a targeted group of businesses is selectively allowed to 
remain operational, while others are forcibly shut down, the conventional 
metrics of horizontal and vertical equity dissipate the boundaries of 
garden variety tax policy analysis. 
Applying the same conventional tax policy to both locked-down and 
operational ventures, as the CARES Act purports to do, is simply not good 
tax policy. Similarly, employing carbon-copy vertical equity to both 
 
 375. James Conca, The Coronavirus Accelerates Online’s Destruction of Brick & Mortar Shopping, 
FORBES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2020/08/21/the-coronavirus-
accelerates-onlines-destruction-of-brick--mortar-shopping/?sh=4bdb34c54734. 
 376. See Melissa A. Peters, The Little Guy Myth: The Fair Act’s Victimization Of Small Businesses, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1925, 1941-42 (2001) (noting the vigorous impact of small businesses on the 
economy); Lyndsey Insani,Is Financial Difficulty Really Enough? The Battle Of The Circuits To Define 
Reasonable Cause For Small Business’ Failure To Pay Taxes, 53 VAL. U.L. REV. 385, 394-5 (2019) 
(emphasizing the significance of small businesses on United States employment, particularly with respect 
to disadvantaged groups); Blake D. Morant, The Quest For Bargains In an Age Of Contractual 
Formalism: Strategic Initiatives For Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL  EMERGING BUS. L. 233, 242 (2003) 
(observing the impact of small businesses on entrepreneurial opportunities for women and minorities); 
Nadia Udeshi, Saving Small Business From The Big Impact Of Data Breach: A Tiered Federal Approach 
To data Protection Law, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 389, 392-95 (2020) (evaluating the 
significant impact of small businesses on the United States economy). 
 377. HIDDEN FIGURES (20th Century Fox 2016). 
 378. Id. 
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profitable (operational) and nonessential (locked down) businesses is 
illogical. This Article suggests that employing the traditional notions of 
tax-exempt status to qualifying COVID-Companies is one solution to 
revitalizing the economic lifeblood of the United States economy. 
Allowing COVID-Companies, for a time, the same tax benefits afforded 
not for-profit organizations would allow these businesses to mitigate 
federal income tax exposure during their economic recovery period and 
incentivize individuals and profitable entities to participate in their 
renewal. This revolutionary application of “old” tax policy,379 
strategically directed at COVID-Companies, need not be hindered by the 
longstanding scholarly debate surrounding for- and not for-profit 
charitable entities, but instead be the catalyst for resurrecting small 
business operations injured by government-mandated lockdowns. To 
evaluate the application of tax-exempt status on COVID-Companies, 
Section A considers the societal need to protect and foster nonessential 
businesses. Section B examines the application of “old” tax law to a new 
problem. Finally, Section C proposes that Code section 501(c) be 
revolutionized for COVID-Companies. 
A. Protecting and Fostering Nonessential Businesses 
Current and proposed small business tax policy measures, such as 
accelerated depreciation allowances,380 employment tax credits,381 and 
qualified business income deductions,382 are inadequate to address the 
long-term impact that state lockdowns have on nonessential businesses.383 
Data evidences that COVID-19 closures resulted in 60 percent of 
businesses collapsing.384 Without significant financial assistance, small 
businesses floundering under the pandemic’s weight will likewise fail.385 
To protect and foster these ventures’ perpetuities, novel and well-
designed economic aid to COVID-Companies must be straightforward 
 
 379. Edward A. Zelinsky, Why The Buffet-Gates Giving Pledge Requires Limitation Of The Estate 
Tax Charitable Deduction, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 393, 397 (2014) (noting income tax charitable deduction 
limitations began with the Revenue Act of 1917). 
 380. I.R.C. § 179 (2021). 
 381. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301. 
 382. See TCJA, supra note 231, at § 199A. 
 383. See e.g., Garett Watson et al., Details and Analysis of President-Elect Joe Biden's Tax 
Proposals October 2020 Update, TAX FOUND. (Oct. 2020), https://files.taxfoundation.org 
/20201109095935/Details-and-Analysis-of-President-Elect-Joe-Bidens-Tax-Plan.pdf (providing for a 
manufacturing Communities Tax Credit to reduce the tax liability of businesses experiencing work force 
layoffs or government closures.). 
 384. Anjali Sundaram, Yelp Data Shows 60% of Business Closures Due to the Coronavirus 
Pandemic are now Permanent, CNBC (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/16/yelp-data-
shows-60percent-of-business-closures-due-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic-are-now-permanent.html. 
 385. Bartik et al., supra note 28, at 17666. 
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and devoid of overly complicated rules and byzantine eligibility 
requirements.386 
Small businesses tend to be financially fragile, having neither the 
economic sustainability nor requisite equity base to remain operational 
amidst a global pandemic.387 In addition, some may be unable to secure 
the accounting or legal counsel necessary to understand the myriad of tax 
details embedded in the CARES Act.388 While some may have the 
financial means to file federal lawsuits challenging the constitutionality 
of state closures,389 it is impractical to consider that every—or perhaps 
even most—small businesses harmed by state closures can fiscally 
withstand the expenses and hazards of litigation amidst deteriorating 
governmental revenues.390  
As discussed, imposing an excess profits tax on essential businesses 
profiting from the pandemic is not the ideal means to address nonessential 
business funding amidst a non-wartime period.391 Nonessentials are 
weary of governmental intrusion.392 They were initially targeted by the 
Executive Office as recommended for closure393 and subsequently shut 
down against their will in most states.394 For those that defied lockdown 
orders, the media is replete with stories of governmental authorities 
imposing fines.395 
 
 386. Id. (noting that 13 percent of respondents (out of more than 5,800 small businesses surveyed) 
documented they did not anticipate taking out CARES Act PPP loans due to application hassles, federal 
governmental distrust, or complicated eligibility rules). 
 387. Id. at 17656, 17665 (documenting that small firms are “extremely fragile”, having only enough 
cash to sustain themselves for approximately 2 weeks). See also Mirit Eyal-Cohel, Why Is Small Business 
The Chief Business Of Congress?, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 n. 4 (2012) (proposing that small businesses do 
not have enough equity base (collateral) to secure loans and credit). 
 388. Andrew Osterland, Here’s why a nightmare tax season is ahead for small businesses, CNBC 
(Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/14/heres-why-a-nightmare-tax-season-awaits-small-
businesses.html. 
 389. See, e.g., Damon Root, This Business Is Suing the Government Over a Coronavirus Closure 
Order, REASON (Mar, 30, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/03/30/this-business-is-suing-the-government-
over-a-coronavirus-closure-order/. 
 390. In addition, ascertaining a business’ actual damages, and the exact nature of state law takings, 
becomes even more complicated amidst "rolling lockdowns", with no foreseeable end on the horizon. See 
Matthew Boesler, Kashkari Says U.S. May Face 18 Months of Rolling Shutdowns, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-12/fed-s-kashkari-says-u-s-may-face-18-
months-of-rolling-shutdowns. 
 391. See supra Part II.C. 
 392. See Nick Pecoraro, “I’m tired of being told what to do”: Local ‘nonessential’ business opening 
ahead of Newsom’s schedule, GOLD COUNTRY MEDIA (May 5, 2020), https://goldcountrymedia.com 
/news/174248/im-tired-of-being-told-what-to-do-local-nonessential-businesses-opening-ahead-of-
newsoms-schedule/. 
 393. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
 394. States that did not issue stay-at-home orders, supra note 20. 
 395. See e.g., Leila Miller, This L.A. company was hit with the state's largest-ever Covid-19 fine. 
Some say it's a model for worker safety, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 25, 2020), https://www.latimes 
.com/california/story/2020-09-25/la-me-overhill-farms-safety-committee; Jim Guy, $35,000 in fines 
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Small businesses are vital to the United States employment sector.396 If 
their closures continue, the federal government may need to devote 
further resources to fund unemployment benefits. Of the more than 32.5 
million United States business operations, 31.7 million are “small”.397 
Since 2000, small businesses account for 65.1 percent of net new job 
creation.398 However, the United States Census Bureau Survey reports 
that approximately 34.2 percent of small businesses were financially 
impacted by COVID-19.399 A separate survey identifies that 43 percent of 
small and mid-size businesses suffered “significant to severe” impacts 
from the pandemic, with small businesses being most harshly affected.400 
Although the term "small” is not inescapably synonymous with the term 
“nonessential,” data supports that small businesses—the quintessence of 
economic prosperity in the United States401—have been 
disproportionately impacted by lockdown orders.402 With fiscal aid 
vacillating, federal relief strained amidst bipartisan pushback, and state 
budgets emaciated, novel avenues must be considered to better foster and 
preserve nonessential businesses throughout their economic recovery 
from the pandemic.403 
 
issued in Fresno to nonessential businesses for operating during pandemic, FRESNO BEE (May 7, 2020),  
https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article242576966.html; Reggie Ellis, Lindsay approves fines for 
nonessential businesses still open, SUN GAZETTE (May 6, 2020), https://thesungazette 
.com/article/business/2020/05/06/lindsay-oks-fines-for-nonessential-businesses-still-open/; and Kelly 
Bauer, Businesses Rack Up $120,000 In Fines To City For Not Following Stay At Home Order, BLOCK 
CLUB CHI. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/04/08/businesses-rack-up-120000-in-fines-
to-city-for-not-following-stay-at-home-order/. 
 396. Stephen Michael Spivey, A Snake Eating Its Own Tail: The Self-Defeating Nature of an Overly 
Broad Implementation of Section 1071, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 107, 115 n. 65 (2018) (documenting that 
small businesses are vital to the United States economy). 
 397. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFF. OF ADVOC. (Oct. 2020), 
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/05122043/Small-Business-FAQ-2020.pdf 
(“Small” business is defined as an independent business having less than 500 employees). See also Todd 
Kehoe, What counts as a ‘business’? It might not be what you think it is, ALBANY BUS. REV. (Apr. 11, 
2019), https://www.bizjournals.com/albany/news/2019/04/11/number-of-businesses-in-the-united-states. 
html (documenting that there are more than 32.5 million United States businesses). 
 398. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 398.  
 399. Id. 
 400. Small Businesses Feel Biggest Impact, supra note 24 (per this survey, small businesses were 
identified as those having 1-4 employees).  
 401. Joseph A. Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Businesses: Section 404 and the Case 
for a Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 429, 437 (2005). 
 402. Id. 
 403. See Ben Casselman, States Try to Rescue Small Businesses as U.S. Aid Is Snarled, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/10/business/economy/states-small-businesses.html. 
See also Jarrett Renshaw & David Morgan, Despite ‘productive’ Republican meeting, Biden will not 
accept a scaled-down COVID-19 bill – White House, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2021), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-congress-idUSKBN2A12TV. 
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B. Applying “Old” Tax Law To a New Problem 
The Code provides tax-exempt status to 29 variations of Code section 
501(c)(3) charitable organizations.404 These non-profit organizations, no 
matter the type, are exempt from federal income taxation so long as 
certain requirements are satisfied.405 Federal law likewise grants 
individuals and corporations tax deductions for charitable contributions 
made during the year, if so permitted under Code section 170.406 
However, tax deductibility restrictions exist; for example, donations made 
to section 501(c)(3) organizations are deductible, while donations made 
to section 501(c)(4) "social welfare" organizations are not.407 
Congress’s legislative intent in providing tax-exempt status to non-
profit organizations was to support groups that promote the general 
welfare, thereby partially relieving the federal government of financial 
burdens.408 More pointedly, while Treasury loses revenue by providing 
tax-exempt status to qualifying organizations, such loss is 
 
 404. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See also Chad J. Pomeroy, Let My Arm Be Broken Off At The Elbow, 
71 OKLA. L. REV. 453, 462 n. 35 (2019). Examples of § 501(c)(3) organizations, which encompass 
“corporations, any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster 
national or international amateur sports competition… or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
animals….” include the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, National Collegiate Athletic Association, 
United Way, Special Olympics, and Boy Scouts of America. Other types of entities falling within the 
parameter of § 501(c)(3) exemption from tax include civil leagues, labor organizations, chambers of 
commerce, recreational clubs, fraternal orders and societies, cemetery companies, credit unions, certain 
insurance companies, and veteran organizations. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(1), (2), (4)-(29). 
 405. For example, per I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), organizations are prohibited from attempting to influence 
legislation and supporting any candidates for public office, whereas veterans organizations under I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(19) are not prohibited from engaging in such activities. 
 406. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a) (permitting a tax deduction for charitable contributions made); 170(b)(1) 
(providing percentage limitations for individuals), and 170(b)(2) (providing a 10% taxable income limit 
for corporations). See also Jennifer McCrabb Black, Reforming 501(c)(3): Putting the “Charity” Back In 
The Charitable Deduction, 13 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 251, 253 (2010). 
 407. I.R.C. § 170(c) defines "charitable contribution" narrowly, to include only certain types of 
donations such as those made to the government, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations, and veteran's 
organizations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) organizations are not included in this list, thus delineating the ability of 
donors to take a tax deduction for contributions made to them per I.R.C. § 170(a)(1); however, some have 
advocated that “social welfare organizations” be treated in a similar manner to charitable organizations, 
thereby permitting the deductibility of donations. See e.g., IRS Denials of Charitable Status: A Social 
Welfare Organization Problem, 82 MICH. L. REV. 508 (1983). 
 408. H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) ("The exemption from taxation of money and property 
devoted to charitable and other purposes is based on the theory that the Government is compensated for 
the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by 
appropriations from other public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general 
welfare."). See also Bob Jones University v. United States. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc., 461 U.S. 
574 (1983) ("Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the 
development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of 
public institutions of the same kind. Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial to the social 
order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that 
of England."). 
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counterbalanced by the federal government appropriating less taxpayer 
money to public service engagements funded by charitable 
organizations.409 Indeed, with more than one million charitable non-
profits in the United States, these organizations are on the economic front 
lines of feeding the hungry, housing the homeless, and educating the 
populous.410 
The United States enjoys a rich history of charitable purpose 
organizations.411 During his 1831 visit to America, Alexis de Tocqueville 
perceived the establishment of voluntary associations that better served 
the common good.412 Such associations led to the founding of “hospitals, 
prisons, and schools.”413 Even volunteer fire departments, still in 
existence today, found early root in 19th century American settlements.414  
Federal tax exemption for charitable organizations was first codified in 
the Tariff Act of 1894;415 however, the Supreme Court found 
unconstitutional the Tariff Act’s  income tax, resulting in the 
abandonment of charitable tax-exempt status.416 The Revenue Act of 
1909 restored the Tariff Act’s tax-exempt language, setting forth a private 
inurement prohibition.417 Two years later, in 1913, Congress ratified the 
Sixteenth Amendment, which made the income tax constitutional, and 
passed the Revenue Act of 1913, which provided tax-exempt status for 
select non-profit organizations.418 Individual income tax deductions first 
became available under the Revenue Act of 1917.419 It was not until the 
Revenue Act of 1936, however, that similar corporate tax deductions were 
 
 409. Id. See also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, A (Partial) Defense of § 501(c)(4)’s “Catchall” Nature, 21 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 439, 457 (2018) (describing that for an organization to qualify for I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) status, the organization’s activities must be shown to lessen the government’s own burdens). 
 410. See Nathan Bult, Why Congress must help nonprofits, THE HILL (May 14, 2020), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/497825-why-congress-must-help-nonprofits. 
 411. For a comprehensive examination of the history of tax-exempt nonprofit corporations, see Eric 
C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A Theory of the Charitable Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Corporation, 49 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719, 1727-40 (2016). 
 412. Id. at 1728. 
 413. Id. (citing to 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 106 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1951) (1840)). 
 414. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, STAT. OF 
INCOME BULL., at 105 (Winter 2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf.  
 415. Chaffee, supra note 412 at 1735. See also Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). 
 416. Chaffee, supra note 412 at 1735. See also Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 
634 (1895). 
 417. Corporate Income Tax of 1909, Pub. L. No. 61-5, 36 Stat. 112 (1909) (The private inurement 
prohibition disallows tax-exempt organizations from using income or assets to unreasonably benefit board 
members, trustees, officers, or key employees). 
 418. See Chaffee, supra note 412, at 1735-6. See also U.S. Const. amend. XVI ; Revenue Act of 
1913, ch. 16, § IIG, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913). 
 419. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 214(a), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). 
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introduced.420 The modern Code came to fruition with the passage of the 
Revenue Act of 1954, which introduced Code section 501(c) for tax-
exempt organizations.421 While numerous other amendments and acts 
have levied select requirements on charitable organizations,422 the current 
section 501 is a highly refined provision spanning two centuries of 
congressional contemplation.423  
Like small businesses, non-profit organizations are integral to 
economic stability and mobility in the United States.424 They provide 
essential public benefits that either fall outside the scope of government 
intrusion or relieve the government from providing similar assistance.425 
These organizations profoundly rely on outside donations to finance their 
operations,426 and the tax benefits afforded under Code section 501(c)(3) 
enable them to remain competitive.427 As previously discussed, some 
suggest that Congress should relax section 501(c) restrictions to allow 
social enterprise organizations, that straddle for- and not for-profit 
missions, to enjoy more favorable tax treatment.428  
Beyond the scope of social enterprises, there now exists a credible 
public purpose in expanding section 501 to include COVID-Companies. 
Prior to pandemic closures, 43 percent of small businesses in the United 
States made less than $50,000 in annual sales.429 Currently, the average 
small business owner/operator salary is about $65,000.430 More than 27 
million non-farm sole proprietorship tax returns were filed in 2018.431 
 
 420. Chaffee, supra note 412, at 1736. See also Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 23(o), 
49 Stat. 1648. 
 421. Id. at 1762. See also Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 23, 48 Stat. 680, 690. 
 422. Id. at 1737. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Naomi Camper, A Strong Nonprofit Sector is Key to Thriving Communities, ASPEN INSTITUTE 
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/a-strong-nonprofit-sector-is-key-to-thriving-
communities/. 
 425. Seong J. Kim, Hiding Behind The Corporate Veil: A Guide For Non-Profit Corporations With 
For-Profit Subsidiaries, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 189, 193 (2009). 
 426. Joseph S. Klapach, Thou Shalt Not Politic: A Principled Approach To Section 501(c)(3)’s 
Prohibition Of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504, 506 (1999). 
 427. Id. 
 428. See Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, What Is A “Social” Business An Why Does The Answer 
Matter?, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 278, 304-05 (2014) (noting that due to social enterprises 
straddling the line between for- and not for-profit organizations, novel hybrid entities are necessary to 
help acclimate these blurred organizations).  
 429. Janet Attard, How Much Do Small Businesses Really Earn?, BUS. KNOW-HOW (Dec. 18, 
2020), https://www.businessknowhow.com/money/earn.htm. 
 430. Average Small Business Owner/Operator Salary, PAYSCALE (last updated Jan. 24, 2021), 
https://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Small_Business_Owner_%2F_Operator/Salary. 
 431. Table 1. Nonfarm Sole Proprietorships: Business Receipts, Selected Deductions, Payroll, and 
Net Income, by Industry Sectors, Tax Year 2018, IRS OFF. OF STAT. (last visited Feb. 29, 2021), 
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-nonfarm-sole-proprietorship-statistics/. 
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Small businesses are the pulse of the economy;432 however, COVID-19 
lockdowns have forced many of these businesses to exhaust their life 
savings to keep their respective businesses afloat.433 Unemployment rates 
reached unprecedented levels since the pandemic’s onset.434 Early stage 
small business losses may have longer-term job loss and economic 
equality implications.435 Current estimates predict the United States labor 
force  may not yield to pre-pandemic levels until 2022.436 To help buffer 
the impact on small businesses, the historic notions of Code section 501 
should be relaxed to allow COVID-Companies tax-exempt status during 
their recovery. If  granted temporary tax-exempt status, section 501(c)(3) 
and complementary Code section 170 would provide COVID-Companies 
refuge to help salvage lost competitive advantages and customer bases 
amidst pandemic-related government lockdowns.437 
C. Making IRC Section 501(c) Work for COVID-Companies 
This Article recommends that Congress revolutionize Code section 
501(c)(3) to aid small businesses harmed by pandemic closures. COVID-
Company, tax-exempt status should be extended to qualifying businesses 
via default classification under the check-the-box regulations438 or by 
filing an income tax return specifically designed for businesses electing 
COVID-Company tax-exempt status.439 To bring this proposal to fruition, 
Congress must substantially loosen or eliminate the section 501(c) 
 
 432. See Staff Report, COVID-19: A Roundup of Resources for Small Businesses, DALLAS 
INNOVATES (July 14, 2020), https://dallasinnovates.com/covid-19-a-roundup-of-resources-for-small-
businesses/. 
 433. Catherine Thorbecke, Small business owners tapping into personal savings, 401(k)s and more 
amid coronavirus crisis, ABC NEWS (Mar. 18. 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/small-business-
owners-tapping-personal-savings-401ks-amid/story?id=69623954. 
 434. Unemployment Rates During the COVID-19 Pandemic: In Brief, CONG. RES. SERV. (updated 
Jan. 12, 2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46554.pdf. 
 435. Robert W. Fairlie, The Impact of COVID-19 On Small Business Owners: Evidence Of Early-
Stage Losses From The April 2020 Current Population Survey, NBER WORKING PAPER No.27309 (June 
2020), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27309/w27309.pdf. 
 436. Paul Davidson, Economy will return to pre-pandemic output level by mid-2021, sooner than 
expected, CBO predicts, USA TODAY (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021 
/02/01/unemployment-economy-return-pre-covid-level-mid-2021/4342660001/. 
 437. See David Bradley Olsen & Eric Friske, Contractual Obligations During the Coronavirus 
Pandemic: Avoidance, Enforcement, and Renegotiation, HENSON EFRON (Mar. 30, 2020), 
https://hensonefron.com/contractual-obligations-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-avoidance-
enforcement-and-renegotiation/ (offering that some businesses, although perhaps unaffected by direct 
pandemic government closures, lost their customer base). 
 438. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1, -2, -3 (2021). 
 439. I.R.S. Form 990, Return of Organization Exempt From Income Tax, is the method by which 
non-profit organizations file their annual income tax returns. This article proposes that this form either be 
amended to include COVID-Company status, or a new I.R.S. form could be crafted to account for COVID-
Companies electing to be treated as non-profit organizations. 
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restrictions, which include limits on private inurement,440 lobbying and 
political activities,441 the commerciality doctrine,442 the unrelated 
business tax,443 as well as the tax-exempt purpose requirement for 
COVID-Companies.444 Qualifying entities would then be required to 
convert into federal tax corporations, as sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, limited liabilities companies, and other pass-through entities 
that are generally not permitted to operate as tax-exempt.445 
COVID-Company status should be restricted to businesses that fiscally 
suffered under the lockdowns. To qualify, Congress could use language 
similar to that of the CARES Act section 2301.446 Thus, eligible 
employers must have operated a business that was either fully or partially 
suspended because of governmental orders during 2020.447 Any 
businesses not forcibly locked down by government order, but which 
suffered significant economic hardship, should likewise qualify for 
COVID-Company status if they can demonstrate a significant decline in 
gross receipts.448 The CARES Act section 2301 establishes a bright line 
test to determine if an eligible employer has suffered a significant decline 
in gross receipts.449 For purposes of COVID-Company tax-exempt status, 
this Article suggests this test would suffice.  
In addition, COVID-Company eligibility should be limited to small 
businesses, and tax-exempt status for qualifying entities should be granted 
 
 440. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual”). 
 441. See id. See also I.R.C. § 501(h)(1) (“In the case of an organization to which this subsection 
applies, exemption from taxation under subsection (a) shall be denied because a substantial part of the 
activities of such organization consist of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation…”). 
 442. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (“no part of the [tax-exempt organization’s] net earnings of which inures 
to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.”; I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(b) (documenting that the tax-
exempt organization’s primary activity cannot have “a direct counterpart in, or [be] conducted in the same 
manner as is the case in the realm of for-profit organizations.” 
 443. See I.R.C. § 501(b). 
 444. Organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) must be both organized and operated exclusively for 
one or more exempt purposes described in subsection (3). The organizational test looks at the entity's 
organizational documents, such as articles of incorporation, to insure it complies; the operational test looks 
to the entity’s activities to determine if its operations are consistent with its charitable purpose. 
 445. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See also Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir. 
1938) (“To gain exemption…. The petitioner must be a corporation”). See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, 
Nonprofit Displacement And The Pursuit Of Charity Through Public Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 525, 540 (2017).  
 446. CARES Act, supra note 31, at § 2301. 
 447. Id. at § 2301(c)(2)(A). Business that did not shut down, but which suffered a significant decline 
in gross receipts during this period, and tax-exempt organizations also qualify for this credit. Id. at § 
(c)(2)(B), (C). 
 448. Id. at § 2301(c)(2)(B). 
 449. Id. at § 2301(c)(2)(B)(i). A significant decline in gross receipts essentially entails comparing 
2020's quarterly gross receipts to 2019's quarterly gross receipts. For a significant decline, the 2020 
receipts must be less than 50% of the gross receipts from the same quarter in the prior year. 
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for a limited period that would allow these businesses the opportunity to 
regain economic footing, without relying indefinitely on government and 
private party funding. Limiting tax-exempt status to small businesses can 
be achieved by deploying an average gross receipts threshold, similar to 
the gross receipts test in Code section 448(c).450 “Gross receipts” includes 
sales net of returns and allowances, and any amounts received for 
services.451 To be considered a small taxpayer, Code section 448(c) sets 
forth an average gross receipts test for a three year period, where a 
taxpayer’s receipts do not exceed $25,000,000.452 If and when a COVID-
Company fails to satisfy the average gross receipts test, it would be 
required to revert back to its former for-profit status without penalty. 
COVID-Companies should also be given the option to voluntarily opt out 
of tax-exempt status at any time. The tax year for the COVID-Company 
non-profit would end in the year the business fails to pass the gross 
receipts test or the year of for-profit election.  
For entities electing into COVID-Company tax-exempt status, 
donations made to them should likewise qualify for Code section 170 tax 
deductibility.453 While most COVID-Companies would arguably remain 
for-profit entities during their tax-exempt election period, it is unlikely 
that the “warm glow” effect associated with non-profit organizations 
would hinder third parties from donating to them.454 Already, the public 
is contributing to small businesses affected by the pandemic.455 The 
GoFundMe Small Business Relief Initiative has revolutionized the 
manner in which donors can give to businesses facing financial 
depletion.456 These public donations, even without accompanying tax 
benefits, demonstrate the broad social interest that outside parties have in 
preserving nonessential businesses. Tax-deductibility would further 
encourage third-party giving, while also incentivizing estate and gift tax 
level contributions, as well as corporate donations. Particularly, large-
scale companies that profited from the lockdowns may be more 
 
 450. I.R.C. § 448(c) sets forth an average gross receipts test for corporations and partnerships. 
 451. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T(f)(2)(iv) (“Gross receipts” also include interest, original issue discount, 
tax-exempt interest, dividends, rents, royalties, and annuities). 
 452. I.R.C. § 448(c)(1). This $25,000,000 threshold has been increased for inflation to $26,000,000 
or less for tax years beginning in 2021, 2020 and 2019. See Rev. Proc. 2020-45, I.R.B. 1016 (Oct. 26, 
2020). 
 453. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) & 170. In addition, an estate tax deduction should be permitted under I.R.C. 
§ 2055, as well as a gift tax deduction under I.R.C. § 2522.  
 454. See Galle, supra note 371, at 1224-25 (regarding the typicality of “warm glow” effects 
associated with charitable organizations). 
 455. See Help Small Businesses Affected by Coronavirus, GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme 
.com/small-business-relief-fundraisers (last visited Feb. 5, 2021) (GoFundMe currently has 17,802 active 
fundraisers requesting relief attributable to Covid-19). 
 456. Id. 
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incentivized to aid nonessential companies in getting back on their feet.457  
Some may argue that bestowing tax-exempt status on COVID-
Companies is unjust, as a direct affront to non-profit charitable 
organizations competing for the same funds.458 However, COVID-
Companies were forcibly locked out of the free market economy, 
prohibited for a time from making any form of profit due to government 
mandates. Any competitive edge that might arise from COVID-
Companies being granted tax-exempt status would balance the injustices 
of being forcibly closed at no fault of their own. Criticisms have been 
raised about non-profit entities engaging in for-profit activities, while 
simultaneously enjoying the benefits of tax-exempt status.459 Scholars 
Gail Lasprogata and Marya Cotton note that non-profits participate in for-
profit activities because “they have been forced into the positions they are 
in by the harsh and unforgiving fiscal environment and the need for more 
capital to stay alive.”460 This is the same merciless landscape that COVID-
Companies are now forced to endure; it is therefore justifiable that they 
be granted similar Congressional reprieve as non-profit organizations. 
To the extent COVID-Companies compete with preexisting charitable 
organizations engaging in similar commercial activities, this Article 
maintains that such competition is a necessary evil. Like the rest of the 
United States economy, non-profit organizations need small businesses 
and their employees. In 2019, $309.66 billion of all charitable giving, 
equating to 69 percent, was derived from individuals.461 In comparison, 
charitable funding by corporations amounted to just $21.09 billion.462 
With 20.6 million jobs in the United States lost at the onset of the 
pandemic,463 it is improbable that individual contributions to charitable 
organizations will remain sustainable without new job growth. Charitable 
organizations are feeling the impact of the profound unemployment 
 
 457. See I.R.C. § 170(a), (b)(2). See also Brock Blake, Amazon: Small Business Friend or Foe, 
FORBES (Sep. 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brockblake/2019/09/23/amazon-friend-or-
foe/?sh=6684e7267367 (noting that Amazing is increasing its “efforts to encourage small and medium-
sized businesses to partner with the brand. The company recently announced it has launched 150 tools 
and services since the beginning of the year, all aimed at helping independent small and medium-sized 
businesses grow their online sales. Last year Amazon Storefronts launched to help customers shop 
exclusively from U.S.-based small businesses."). 
 458. This argument already exists even within the realm of non-profit and for-profit sector 
enterprises. See Gail A. Lasprogata & Marya N. Cotton, Contemplating “Enterprise”: The Business And 
Legal Challenges Of Social Entrepreneurship, 41 AM. BUS. L. J. 67, 73 (2003). 
 459. Id.  
 460. Id. 
 461. Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TR., https://www.nptrust.org/ 
philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2021). 
 462. Id. 
 463. Stephanie Soucheray, US job losses due to COVID-19 highest since Great Depression, 
CIDRAP (May 8, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2020/05/us-job-losses-due-
covid-19-highest-great-depression. 
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created by the lockdowns.464 Allowing COVID-Companies the possibility 
of increased outside donations would give these injured businesses the 
opportunity to replenish their own commercial activities. Once 
economically revitalized, COVID-Companies will be in a position to 
resume sustainable gifting back to the non-profit sector that so heavily 
relies on individual contributions, thus helping to bring the United States 
economy back full circle. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Following the first confirmed United States case of COVID-19,465 state 
governors issued orders directing residents to shelter in place, while 
forcing nonessential businesses to temporarily close.466 Only those 
ventures deemed essential were permitted to remain operational. For the 
first time in United States history, distinctions were made between 
essential and nonessential business operations, ultimately devastating the 
latter, while big-box retailers economically flourished.  
To remedy the economic calamity facing nonessential businesses, 
proposals have been made to include challenging the constitutionality of 
state governors’ actions under the Takings Clause 467 and imposing an 
excess profits tax on COVID-profiting companies.468 While these 
proposals raise important issues that warrant closer examination, they are 
each flawed in that they fall short of addressing the magnitude of the 
economic problem and the technological shift in the United States 
economy. 
Imposing an excess profits tax on COVID-profiting companies may 
appear desirable on the surface; however, such a premise contradicts 
historical United States tax policy, which restricts the use of the tax to 
actual wartime engagements against enemy combatants. In addition, 
imposing an excess profits tax fails to address the root issue surrounding 
economically devastated businesses—that governmental action was the 
cause of the financial downturn. Essential businesses are not responsible 
for the economic destruction of numerous small businesses; thus, 
targeting for-profit entities that legally increased their profits during state-
mandated lockdowns digresses from the fact that it is the government that 
should bear the burden of rehabilitating those businesses that were 
 
 464. Coral Murphy, Nonprofits face grim outlook as worried Americans cut back on donations 
during COVID-19 pandemic, USA TODAY (October 14, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2020/10/14/nonprofits-american-heart-association-struggle-
donations-drop-during-covid/3635486001/. 
 465. See supra Part I.A., B. 
 466. See supra Part I.C. 
 467. See supra Part II.A. 
 468. See supra Part II.C. 
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forcibly restricted from participating in commercial engagement. While 
alternative suggestions that injured businesses should file lawsuits against 
state governments alleging constitutional takings garner considerable 
merit, the ability of devastated businesses to now tackle expensive and 
lengthy litigation is improbable. Further, depleted budgets would restrict 
states’ abilities to provide just compensation. 
In an attempt to remedy economic concerns arising during the 
pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act.469 However, the CARES 
Act, in conjunction with the more recent Tax Certainty and Disaster Tax 
Relief Act of 2020, does not adequately remedy nonessential businesses, 
as it fails to directly target economic recovery for the nonessentials. 
Instead, the tax legislation benefits both essential and nonessential 
businesses, resulting in exacerbated inequities. This is particularly 
concerning given that the government found such distinction crucial when 
determining which businesses to take profits from at the onset of the 
pandemic but markedly absent when determining how to alleviate the 
resulting financial harms. 
This United States has a quasi-charitable responsibility to 
economically heal those businesses that ultimately bore the greatest 
incumbrance.470 No business or set of businesses should bear the financial 
public burden of a national health crisis alone. To address the novel social 
circumstances resulting from COVID-19, radical tax policy is needed.471 
This Article recommends that nonessential businesses be granted a 
complete "shield" from taxation in the form of temporary non-profit 
status.472 To bring this proposal to fruition, this Article proposes that 
Congress loosen or eliminate Internal Revenue Code section 501(c) 
restrictions, restrict “COVID-Company” status to small business that 
fiscally suffered under the lockdowns, and be available for a limited 
period to allow qualifying entities the ability to regain economic footing 
without relying indefinitely on government and private party funding. In 
addition, this Article suggests that donations made to qualifying 
businesses be tax deductible, which would then invite a more holistic, 








 469. See supra Part II.B. 
 470. See supra Part III.A. 
 471. See supra Part III.B. 
 472. See supra Part III C. 
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